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I. INTRODUCTION
When agreements have been entered into that create a
conflict with the letter or the spirit of a regulatory scheme of some
kind, two problem sets emerge for resolution by the private law of
obligations. The first relates to the very enforceability of the
agreement itself. The second pertains to the consequences for the
parties if the agreement is indeed held to be unenforceable. It is
notorious that the common law has had considerable difficulty in
dealing with both sets of problems sensibly. It is not abundantly
obvious why this should be so as it will be argued here that the
most attractive approach to the analysis of these problems is a
relatively straightforward one. A good part of the explanation,
however, must be that the main features of the law dealing with
these questions were settled in a much less regulated environment
than the one in which we now live. Speaking very broadly, the
common law's approach has been to conclude rather easily that the
agreement in question is unenforceable. Consequently, according to
the traditional view, the parties are not only unable to enforce the
agreement, but, in addition, are unable to seek the assistance of the
courts in settling such consequential issues as the location of title to
property transferred under such agreements or the entitlement to
compensation for the value of benefits already conferred in
performance of the unenforceable agreement. This "steadfast hands-
offism" may have been more easily justified in an era when the
commission of an offence, per se, was more likely a signal of
significantly anti-social conduct than it is today. How else are we to
explain the inflated rhetoric of the famous phrase, "No polluted
hand shall touch the pure fountains of justice."1 The continued and
remarkable growth of regulation in the modern era, notwithstanding
1 Collins v. Blantern (1767), 2 Wilson 341 at 350 per Wilmot C.J.
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the occasional political popularity of attempts at "deregulation," has
created an environment in which "steadfast hands-offism" simply
leads to absurd results. For example, in one line of English
authority, to be examined in detail in this paper,2 the mere fact that
the parties failed to record the date of execution of their agreement
in documents otherwise fully complying with the law led to the
infliction of losses of thousands of pounds on apparently reputable
and law-abiding citizens and, at the same time, the conferral of
equivalent windfall benefits on others for which no sensible
justification can be offered. It is not surprising, then, that the law
in this area has attracted the attention of law reform bodies3 and,
in one Commonwealth jurisdiction at least4 has been modified by
statute.
Such reform is, however, unlikely to be universal and is, in
any event, likely simply to instruct the courts to make a fresh start
and fashion doctrine anew in the context of a statutory scheme
conferring a broad discretion to do justice in the individual case.5
What is needed, therefore, whether in the absence of or in tandem
with statutory reform, is a new analytical model for addressing these
questions which will enable the courts to make reasoned and
defensible departures from "steadfast hands-offism" and develop
doctrine more in accord with contemporary circumstances and
expectations. This article attempts to meet this need, in part, and
suggests that appropriate solutions may be mined, especially in the
Canadian context, from the application of traditional common law
methods to the existing case law.
The first of these two problem sets - the question of
enforceability - is the less complex of the two and will receive little
2 The "Moneylenders Acts cases" discussed in Part IV of this article, at notes 100-67, infra.
3 New Zealand Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee, Illegal Contracts
(1969); Law Reform Committee of South Australia, 77ity-Seventh Report Relating die Doctrines
of Fnstration and Illegality in the Law of Contract (1977); Law Reform Commission of British
Columbia, Report on Illegal Transactions (1983); Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on
Anenthnent of the Law of Contract (1987), c.11.
411legal Contracts Ac 1970, Stat. N.Z. 1970, No.129.
5Ibid, ss. 7(1) and (3).
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attention here. In many instances, of course, the regulatory scheme
in question will stipulate that the agreement at issue is
unenforceable. Where this is not so, the problem obviously becomes
more difficult, but it appears to be generally accepted that the
proper method of analysis is that set out in the leading decision in
St. John Shipping Corp. v. Rank.6 In that case, Devlin J. approached
the issue by determining whether, in the light of the purposes and
structure of the statutory scheme and against the background of the
general policy of the common law of enforcing contractual
obligations, courts should exercise their discretion to impose on the
parties the common law sanction of rendering their agreement
unenforceable. As the decision in St. John itself indicates, Devlin J.
recognized that the sanction of unenforceability may be an ill-
devised or unnecessary means for furthering the objects of the
statute, and that in such cases the contract in question should be
enforced. This influential decision has provided a policy-oriented
and instrumental analytical model, offering a modern and thoughtful
approach to the enforceability issue and providing a framework for
reasoned departures from the "steadfast hands-offism" of the past.
Much less progress has been made in the judicial analysis of
consequential issues, however, and it is to these questions -
especially those of a restitutionary, rather than proprietary character
- that the present article is addressed. The central problem to be
confronted in the analysis of the restitutionary claims available to
parties to unenforceable agreements in this context is that the
common law has generally not found it possible to afford relief to
the party whose conduct is in breach of or otherwise in conflict with
the statutory scheme. As will be seen, a variety of devices have
been developed to assist parties who are, in some sense, innocent of
wrongdoing, but a party who is unable to rely on such devices is, in
strict theory at least, unable to recover. It will be argued here that
this is a critical deficiency in the restitutionary analysis of these
problems and that it is a deficiency that has implications beyond the
analysis of the restitutionary rights of the parties per se. In
particular, the inability of the courts to analyze the restitutionary
claims of parties in these situations satisfactorily has led to a
6[1959] 3 All E.R. 683 (Q.B.). See also Shaw v. Groom, [1970] 2 Q.B. 504 (C.A.).
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similarly unsatisfactory analysis of the enforceability and passage of
property issues in an effort to achieve what I suggest are "second-
best" solutions to the problem at hand. For example, courts unable
to grant restitution have been tempted to find the agreement itself
enforceable so as to facilitate recovery of the value of benefits
conferred even though such a holding is, at best, dubious. It will be
suggested here that the St. John Shipping Corp. decision is itself an
illustration of the phenomenon and is, in this respect, seriously
flawed and wrongly decided.7 Similar difficulties have been exported
into the analysis of proprietary issues because deciding that property
has not passed is one possible means of depriving the intended
recipient of some or all of the benefit thereof in a case where,
otherwise, the transfer would come as a complete windfall since the
transferor would be unable to assert a restitutionary right to the
value of the benefit conferred.8  For this reason, resolution of this
central deficiency of the restitutionary analysis of these situations
appears to be a necessary precondition to clear thinking about the
enforceability and passage of property issues. Accordingly, though
some attention will be drawn to the proprietary question in what
follows, discussion of restitutionary aspects of these problems will
occupy centre stage.
The doctrinal explanation for the unwillingness of the
common law to entertain restitutionary claims by parties whose
conduct has rendered an agreement unenforceable in these
situations is that it is assumed that the reasons that justify a refusal
to enforce the agreement also, ipso facto justify a refusal to allow
restitutionary relief. That is, if the plaintiff cannot enforce on the
ground that ex tupi causa (ax dolo malo) non oritur actio, neither
can he sue in restitution. The most frequently cited source of this
proposition is the decision of Lord Mansfield in Holman v. Johnson.
9
It is argued here that this approach ignores the essential differences
between actions to enforce agreements and actions for restitutionary
7See, further, Part III, infra.
81n other cases, however, a decision that property has passed may be taken in order to
facilitate collateral proprietary relief for the plaintiff. See, further, Part IV, section C, infra.
9(1775), 1 Cowp. 341, 98 E.R. 1120.
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relief, and that it obscures the important contribution to be made to
the analysis of these problems by the unjust enrichment principle.
The general proposition is referred to variously here as "the general
rule," "the rule in Holman v. Johnson," and, less charitably, "the
Holman v. Johnson fallacy." To some extent, the Holman v. Johnson
fallacy is part of a more sweeping failure on the part of English
jurisprudence to recognize the independent theoretical basis of
restitutionary claims.10 Accordingly, it will be argued here that the
recognition by the Supreme Court of Canada of the independence
of restitutionary law and its relationship to the unjust enrichment
principle provides an additional justification, if indeed any is needed,
for Canadian courts to develop a new approach to the analysis of
these claims in the present context.
11
The discerning reader will have noted that although the
issues adverted to thus far are commonly referred to in the
literature and the case law as the problem of "illegality," that term
has not yet been employed in this discussion nor in its title. This is
intentional. The more general language of the title is meant to
draw attention to the fact that these problems are not the exclusive
preserve of the textbook category of "illegality" but that they arise
as well, for example, in contexts normally referred to as "informality"
and "ultra vires." This point is emphasized here for two reasons.
First, the Holman v. Johnson fallacy has not clouded the analysis of
these questions in these other areas. Courts have clearly
distinguished between contractual and restitutionary liability and have
usually made restitutionary remedies available to parties to
agreements which are unenforceable on these other grounds. It is
hoped that the law of illegality may draw some inspiration from the
treatment of similar problems in these related areas. Second, and
of no less importance, it is argued that no clear lines of demarcation
can be drawn between "illegality" on the one hand and "informality"
or "ultra vires" on the other. The legal artifacts giving rise to these
problems do not fit neatly into these categories. Traditional
"illegality" cases are thus merely points on a broader spectrum of
10See, generally, Lord Goff and G. Jones, The Law of Restitution, 3d ed. (London: Sweet
& Maxwell, 1986), c.1.
11See, further, the text at notes 201-05, infra.
[voi- 25 No. 4
1987] Restitutionary Recovery - The New Golden Rule
contracts in conflict with statutory policy. Moreover, it is argued
here that this entire spectrum of problems can best be resolved by
the application of a uniform analytical model. As will be seen,
however, this model is of particular assistance in illuminating the
dark corners of the illegality jurisprudence.
The approach advocated here is nothing more than a
recognition of the independence of the enforceability and
restitutionary questions, coupled with the adoption in the
restitutionary context of a policy-oriented and instrumental analysis
of the kind applied to the enforceability issue by Devlin J. in St.
John Shipping Colp. 12  Once it has been determined that
unenforceability of the agreement is an appropriate sanction to
impose, a separate but parallel enquiry should be undertaken to
determine whether restitutionary relief should also be withheld. It
will be obvious that it is an underlying assumption of this thesis that
there are cases where it is appropriate to hold the agreement
unenforceable but to allow restitutionary relief to the party in
conflict with the statute in question. More than this, however, it is
suggested here that clearer recognition of this fact is a key that will
unlock a number of the complexities currently plaguing the law
relating to illegality.
The plan of the article is to first provide a brief and critical
account of the rule in Holman v. Johnson and its exceptions, then
to carefully scrutinize St. John Shipping Coip., and finally to state the
new golden rule approach and provide a sustained argument in
favour of its adoption. Although the preoccupation throughout will
be with statutory illegality, it will also be suggested that the golden
rule approach is equally applicable to the restitutionary issues that
arise when agreements are held unenforceable on grounds of
illegality at common law.
12Supra, note 6.
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II. THE HOLMAN v. JOHNSON PRINCIPLE: ITS CENTRAL
FLAW AND ITS EXCEPTIONS
The general rule at common law is that money paid and
other benefits conferred under agreements rendered unenforceable
by reason of illegality cannot be recovered in quasi-contract or, as
we would now say, in a restitutionary claim. The principle source of
this general rule is a passage from the decision of Lord Mansfield
in Holman v. Johnson13 that is frequently referred to and quoted at
length in the case law and in secondary sources. It is best to let the
famous passage speak for itself:
The objection, that a contract is immoral or illegal as between plaintiff and
defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for
his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general
principles of policy, which the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real
justice, as between him and the plaintiff, by accident if I may so say. The principle
of public policy is this; ex dolo malo non oritur actio. No Court will lend its aid
to a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or an illegal act. If,
from the plaintiff's own stating or otherwise, the cause of action appears to arise
e turpi causa, or the transgression of a positive law of this country, there the Court
says he has no right to be assisted. It is upon that ground that the Court goes; not
for the sake of the defendant, but because they will not lend their aid to such a
plaintiff. So if the plaintiff and defendant were to change sides, and the defendant
was to bring his action against the plaintiff, the latter would then have the
advantage of it; for where both are equally in fault, potior est condido defendends.14
The line of argument is clear and many have found it to be
convincing. The same considerations that make the court unwilling
to enforce the agreement are a sufficient basis, Lord Mansfield
appears to believe, for denying all other forms of relief. This
proposition is said to be "founded in general principles of policy"
15
and to apply even though it may work an injustice as between the
parties.
13(1775), 1 Cowp. 341, 98 E.R. 1120.
141bid. at 343 (Cowp.), 1121 (E.R.).
151kid the second sentence in the quoted passage.
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The central fallacy in this line of reasoning is the apparent
assumption that the policy considerations that might lead to a
conclusion that the agreement should be considered unenforceable
must necessarily lead to a denial of other forms of relief. It
becomes apparent that this is not the case if one views the
withholding of a particular kind of relief as the imposition of a
sanction by the common law in order to provide a disincentive to a
particular kind of conduct. The withholding of different kinds of
remedies thus constitutes the imposition of different kinds of
sanctions, and it is evident that the policy arguments for and against
utilizing particular kinds of sanctions will vary to some extent from
one type of sanction to the next. Thus, for example, the imposition
of the sanction of unenforceability of the agreement has the
consequence of rendering executory aspects of the agreement
unenforceable by either party. It also makes it impossible for either
party to recover the profits secured by the agreement or to
indemnify themselves against losses occasioned by the other party's
non-performance by means of an action for damages for breach of
contract. A policy analysis of the desirability of imposing this kind
of sanction would assess the desirability of imposing these kinds of
consequences on the parties to the agreement. The withholding of
restitutionary relief, on the other hand, has the single consequence
of enabling a recipient of benefits under the unenforceable
agreement to enjoy them without making payment for them at the
contractual or any other rate. There may be cases, of course, where
this is appropriate, but the point being made here is that the policy
justification for imposing this outcome will be different from that
which justifies the withholding of profits and the other consequences
of the unenforceability of the agreement. Similarly, a different set
of policy arguments must come into play if one is to determine that
preventing the passage of property and withholding related
proprietary remedies is an appropriate sanction to impose on either
one or both of the parties.
If it is evident that the policy justifications for the imposition
of these various types of sanctions will differ, it is also apparent that
one might, in a particular context, conclude that the policy
justifications weigh in favour of the imposition of one sanction, such
as unenforceability, but do not extend to the imposition of another,
such as the refusal to allow restitutionary relief. Thus, for example,
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even where policy considerations suggest that unperformed aspects
of the agreement should be held unenforceable and/or that it is
appropriate to deprive the parties of any of the profits they may
have secured from the agreement, it may still be sound policy to
allow recovery of the value of benefits conferred thus far in a
restitutionary claim where refusal to do so would yield unnecessarily
harsh or otherwise inappropriate results in the circumstances of the
particular case. Where this is so, the conferral of a windfall benefit
on the defendant at the plaintiffs expense is palpably unjust and
resort should be made to the general principle of the common law
in favour of allowing recovery of the value of benefits conferred
under ineffective transactions on the basis of the unjust enrichment
principle.16 As Professor Wade demonstrates, 7 there are serious
arguments to be made both in favour of and against the granting of
restitutionary relief in these cases, and it will not always be easy to
strike an appropriate balance between a policy of providing
additional sanctions against unlawful conduct on the one hand and
the prevention of unjust enrichment, or as is sometimes said, the
doing of justice between the parties on the other. The error of
Holman v. Johnson, however, is to assume that the balance is always
to be struck in favour of the withholding of relief. It is an error
that has been repeated many times in the application of this general
principle and one that, it is argued here, is responsible for much of
the complexity and apparent incoherence of doctrine in this area.
There is, to be sure, some irony in attributing so much of
the blame for our current difficulty to Lord Mansfield's judgment in
Holman v. Johnson. In the first place, the decision itself deals solely
with the question of the enforceability of the agreement at issue
and, indeed, resolves that question in favour of permitting the
agreement to be enforced, notwithstanding its somewhat unsavoury
context. The language in the judgment, however, is much broader
'16 The recovery of the value of benefits conferred under ineffective transactions is a large
part of the law of restitution and it is therefore impractical to provide detailed references in
support of the statement made in the text. A review of the treatment of this subject in the
standard texts will, however, support the view that such claims are normally allowed. See, for
example, Lord Goff and G. Jones, supra, note 10, at cc. 17-25.
17J.W. Wade, "Benefits Obtained under Illegal Transactions - Reasons for and against
Allowing Restitution" (1946) 25 Tex. L. Rev. 31.
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than this, and it has certainly been interpreted by subsequent courts
as an authoritative treatment of the question of the availability of
restitutionary relief. Second, it is apparent from other decisions of
Lord Mansfield that he did not himself take an absolutist view on
this question. Rather, he was of the view that courts could and
should exercise a discretion in illegality cases to determine whether
to grant relief in some form.18 Thirdly, the most virulent version of
the Holman v. Johnson fallacy holds that relief cannot be allowed in
quasi-contract in cases where the contract is unenforceable on these
grounds because the quasi-contractual claim is, at bottom,
contractual in nature in the sense that it rests upon a contract
implied to exist between the parties. It is thought that if the
express contract is unenforceable by reason of illegality, then so, too,
is the implicit one.19 Lord Mansfield did not himself suffer from the
confusions generated by this misconceived "implied contract" theory
of quasi-contractual liability. In his famous decision in Moses v.
MacFerlan,20 he clearly indicated that so-called quasi-contract claims
had an independent, non-contractual basis. In sum, it seems likely
that Lord Mansfield would have been surprised by, and would have
disagreed with, at least some of the judicial pronouncements that
have purported to follow from the decision in Holman v. Johnson.
It is generally accepted that there are four well-established
exceptions to the Holman v. Johnson principle.21 First, recovery of
the value of benefits conferred under the agreement is available to
a plaintiff who is either ignorant of or mistaken with regard to the
factual circumstances that render the contract illegal and
unenforceable.22 The ignorance or misunderstanding, of course,
must be bona fide and the plaintiff must resile from the transaction
l8J.K. Grodecki, "In Pari Delicto Est Conditio Defendentis" (1953) 71 L.Q.R. 254 at 257.
1 9See, for example, Parker v. Mason, [1940] 4 All E.R. 199 per du Parcq L.
20(1760), 2 Burr. 1005.
21In addition to the treatment in the standard texts, see J.W. Wade, "Restitution of
Benefits Acquired Through Illegal Transactions" (1947) 95 U. Pa. L Rev. 261.
2 2 See, for example, Burgess v. Zinmerli (1914), 19 B.C.R. 428; Branigan v. Saba, [1924]
N.Z.L.R. 481.
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once aware of its illegal nature.23 In the initial English authority
24
on point, the plaintiff was allowed to recover premiums paid to
insure goods en route from Russia. The plaintiff was unaware that
hostilities had broken out between Russia and England, thus
rendering the contract unenforceable.
Second, recovery in restitution is allowed where the plaintiff
can establish that the statutory scheme rendering the transaction
unenforceable was enacted for the benefit of, or for the protection
of persons in the plaintiff's situation. In the leading authority, Kiri
Cotton v. Dewani,25 the Privy Council allowed a tenant to recover
"key money." The sum was extracted from him by a landlord in
contravention of a provision of a rent control ordinance enacted for
the very purpose of preventing exploitation of this kind. The
plaintiff in such a case was said to be not in pai delicto with the
defendant. Obviously, it would be inconsistent with the policy
underlying the rule that renders the agreement unenforceable to
refuse restitution. Canadian illustrations are to be found in the
context of legislation regulating the health services professions 26 and
in other product safety2 7 and consumer protection contexts.
28
A third exception permits plaintiffs to establish that they are
not in pai delicto with the defendant because their agreement was
induced by the defendant's fraud, oppression, or undue influence.
29
Although this exception evidently confers a broad discretion to
permit relief where the defendant is the principal offender and the
plaintiff has been victimized in some sense, there are not many
2 3 Cowan v. Milboum (1867), L.R. 2 Ex. 230; Clay v. Yates (1856), 1 H. & N. 73.
2 4 0om v. Bruce (1810), 12 East 225, 104 E.R. 87.
25[1960] AC. 192 (P.C.).
26Burgess v. Zimmerli (1914), 19 B.C.R. 428.
27Hough Bros. & Nellernore Co. v. Murdoch (1916), 9 W.W.R. 1064, 26 D.L.R. 200
(Sask. C.A.).
28North-Saslc Seeds Ltd v. Couch (1960), 32 W.W.R. 253 (Sask.); Re Kasprzycki and Abel
et aL (1986), 55 O.R. (2d) 536 (D.C.).
2 9Clarke v. Shee (1774), Cowp. 197.
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examples of its application to be found in the reported case law.
The principal illustrations concern the extraction of extra payments
by creditors as a condition of entering into a composition,30 monies
paid to stifle prosecutions,31 and assets transferred with a view to
defrauding actual or potential creditors.3 2 Application of the
exception requires the courts to assess the relative blameworthiness
of the two parties and the extent to which the plaintiff was a willing
participant in a dishonest scheme. One point of difficulty in the
cases concerns the question whether, in cases of fraud, the fact that
the plaintiff's motives for entering the fraudulent transaction were
also unworthy should preclude relief. Although there is English
authority suggesting that it should,33 the Supreme Court of Canada34
appears to have taken the opposite view, and this appears to be the
position in American law as well.35
These first three exceptions deal with situations in which the
plaintiff is either innocent or less guilty of wrongdoing than the
defendant. The fourth exception is available to parties who, though
initially in pari delicto, have had a change of heart and now wish to
resile from the transaction. In such circumstances, provided that the
agreement has not been wholly, or perhaps, substantially executed,
and the illicit purpose has not been achieved, the repentant party is
said to have a locus poenitentiae from which a restitutionary claim
can be launched.36 The precise meaning of "execution" of the
agreement has proved to be controversial, as has the extent to which
30Smidt v. Cuff (1817), 6 M.& S. 160.
3 1 Williams v. Bayley (1866), L.R. 1 H.L. 200; Fairweather v. McCullough (1918), 43
D.L.R. 299; Envin v. Snelgrove, [1927] 4 D.L.R. 1028; Stoltze v. Fuller, [1939] 1 D.L.R. 1.
3 2 Goodfriend v. Goodfriend, [1972] S.C.R. 640.
3 3 parknson v. College of Ambulance Ltd, [1925] 2 K.B. 1. Cf. Reynell v. Sprye (1852), 1
De G.M. & G. 660.
34Supra, note 32.
35j.W. Wade, supra, note 21 at 276.
36Lowry v. Bordieu (1780), 2 Doug. 468 at 471. And see, generally, R. Merkin,
"Restitution by Withdrawal from Executory Illegal Contracts" (1981) 97 L.Q.R. 420.
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the plaintiff must be able to demonstrate a genuine change of heart.
We will return to these points. For the present, it is sufficient to
note that the exception will not be available once the agreement
has, in some sense, been performed.
In addition to these four exceptions recognized at common
law, English and American courts have occasionally suggested that
there is a further exception, equitable in origin, which would make
relief available on grounds of "public policy" in cases where the
common law would not intervene 7 Examples from the English
cases include the recovery of monies paid under marriage brokerage
contracts, 38 trafficking in public offices,39 frauds on settlements,
40
cases in which the court is exercising jurisdiction over one of its own
officers41 or is, for some other reason, in control of the benefit that
passed under the transaction and must therefore do something with
it,42 and cases where refusal to grant relief would unfairly prejudice
third parties.
43
In recent history, however, English and American courts have
been reluctant to rely on this equitable discretion.44 Almost without
exception, the English authorities are drawn from the 18th and early
19th centuries, and Goff and Jones have questioned whether the
principle would be applied to other cases besides the recovery of
3 7 See Lord Goff and G. Jones, supra, note 10, at 418-20; J.W. Wade, supra, note 21 at
297-99.
3 8 Hennann v. Charleswonh, [1905] 2 KB. 123.
39Law v. Law (1735), 25 E.R. 705 ; Osborne v. Williams (1811), 34 E.R. 360.
40Gay v. Wendow (1687), 2 Freeman 101.
4TRe Thomas, [1894] 1 Q.B. 747.
4 2Davies v. London & Provincial Marine Insurance Co. (1878), 8 Ch. D. 469.
43 Woodhouse v. Shepley (1742), 2 Atk. 535; Debenham v. Ox (1749), 1 Ves. Sen. 276.
4 4 Lord Gaff and G. Jones, supra, note 37; J.W. Wade, supra, note 37.
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monies paid under a marriage brokerage contract.45 To date this
is the equitable exception's only modem application.
Finally, subsequent courts have stressed that the Holman v.
Johnson principle only applies, in Lord Mansfield's words, to a
plaintiff "who founds his cause of action on an immoral or illegal
act,"46 and would not preclude the bringing of what are sometimes
referred to as "collateral claims" which can be asserted without
relying on, or as it is sometimes said, without being required to
plead the illegal act. Such claims might be proprietary, tortious or,
indeed, contractual in nature. Thus, in one case, a builder who
performed renovations without the requisite ministry approvals was
held to be entitled to enforce the defendant's collateral agreement
to obtain such approvals.4 7 In Bowmakers v. Barnet Instruments,48
an owner of goods let out under an illegal hire-purchase agreement
was held to be entitled to sue in conversion when the owner refused
to either pay rent or return the goods. In the recent case of
Saunders v. Edwards,49 the English Court of Appeal held that the
purchaser of a leasehold interest in a flat could sue for damages
flowing from a fraudulent misrepresentation relating to the virtues
of the premises, notwithstanding the fact that the agreement was
possibly tainted by the parties' inflation of the value of chattels
included in the sale in order to avoid stamp duty. The enforcement
of these collateral rights is no doubt better viewed as a limitation of,
rather than an exception to the Holman v. Johnson principle.
Nonetheless, this is obviously one device which affords some relief
to a party in pari delicto and this is also a point to which we shall
return. At this point, it must be emphasized that whatever meagre
45Lord Goff and G. Jones, supra, note 10 at 420.
4 6Holman v. Johnson (1775), 1 Cowp. 342, 98 E.R. 1120 at 343 (Cowp.), 1121 (E.R.).
47Stronginan (1945) Ltd v. Sincock, [1955] 2 Q.B. 525. See also Archbolds' (Freightage)
Ltd v. Spanglett Ltd, [1961] 1 Q.B. 374 (C.A.) for the suggestion that such an undertaking
might be implied. See also, Munro v. French (1979), 103 D.L.R. (3d) 91 (Sask. Q.B.).
48[1945] K.B. 45 (C.A.).
49[1987] 1 W.L.R. 1117 (CA). See also Shelley v. Paddock [1980] 1 Q.B. 348 (C.A.)
and cf. Thackwell v. Barclays Bank PLC, [1986] 1 All E.R. 676 (Q.B.).
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protection is afforded to in pai delicto parties under this rubric
appears to be the only relief available to such parties under the
jurisprudence spawned by the Holman v. Johnson principle.
III. REASSESSING ST. JOHN SHIPPING
The facts of St. John Shipping Corp. v. Rank50 are sufficiently
well known that they need be adverted to only very briefly. A claim
for freight charges was brought by a carrier against the owners of
cargo conveyed by the carrier in a transatlantic voyage. The
defendant resisted the claim on the ground that the plaintiff's ship
was overloaded during the voyage, in breach of the provisions of the
Merchant Shipping Act, and was submerged by more than eleven
inches over its load line at the time of its arrival in the U.K.
Although this breach of the Act exposed the shipper to a fine and,
indeed, would expose the master of a British ship to imprisonment,
the maximum fine that could be levied under the Act was, in the
defendant's view, inadequate to act as an effective disincentive for
illegal conduct of this kind. Although the Act imposed a fine that
was meant to reflect the court's estimate of the extent to which the
shipper profited from his or her breach of statute, the Act further
stipulated that the fine could not exceed a maximum of £100 per
inch or fraction of an inch by which the load line was submerged.
Thus, although it was estimated in the present case that the extra
freight earned by the shipper through overloading was £2,295, the
maximum fine that could be imposed on the shipper was £1,200.
In these circumstances, the defendant and another cargo owner
resolved to inflict their own punishment on the shipper by
withholding amounts totalling £2,295. The defendant withheld
£2,000 and defended this action on the basis that the illegal mode
of performance of the agreement rendered the contact of carriage
on which the plaintiff brought his claim illegal and unenforceable at
common law.
Devlin J. rejected this analysis and, in so doing, provided a
model for the proper analysis of arguments of this kind. Devlin J.
50[1956] 3 All E.R. 683 (Q.B.).
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began by drawing a fundamental distinction between contracts
entered into with the object of committing an illegal act as opposed
to contracts which are expressly or impliedly prohibited by statute5
In the former category of case, such agreements will be
unenforceable if it is established that either or both of the parties
intended, at the time the contract was entered into, to accomplish
the commission of an offence. In analyzing cases in this category,
resort must be made to the statutory prohibition to determine
whether or not the act or objective intended was in fact prohibited
by the statute.
In the second category of cases, the issue is whether or not
the particular contract is prohibited expressly or by implication. If
the contract is prohibited, it is unenforceable, and it matters not
what the intention of the parties might have been at the time of its
creation. By "prohibit," Devlin J. appears to mean nothing more and
nothing less than the familiar notion more usually referred to as a
situation in which the statute "renders" the contract "illegal" or
"unenforceable." There are some statutes, of course, which explicitly
render particular kinds of agreements illegal or, more typically,
"unenforceable," but there are many other situations in which the
central question must be whether the contract conflicts with the
policies of a statutory scheme to so great an extent that the courts
should refuse to enforce the agreement on the ground that it is
implicitly prohibited or rendered illegal by the statute.
It is evident that the facts of St. John Shipping make it a
potential candidate for this last category of illegality. The parties
did not intend, at the time they entered into the contract, to commit
an offence. The statute in question does not explicitly prohibit or
render contracts of carriage illegal. Nonetheless, it can be and was
argued that as the plaintiff engaged in an illegal mode of
performance, the plaintiff is not entitled to rely upon the agreement
and sue to enforce it. As Devlin J. indicated, this argument raises
what is at least partially a question of statutory construction in the
sense that it is necessary to articulate the objectives of the Act's
scheme and consider the implications for that scheme of the courts'
refusal to enforce transactions of the particular kind at issue. One
5 1 bid at 687.
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must ask, in effect, whether the additional sanction of rendering the
particular agreement at issue unenforceable is so consonant with
the explicit features of the statutory scheme that the courts ought to
impose it or, as Devlin J. would have it, should infer that the statute
prohibits this kind of transaction.
More than this, however, Devlin J. insisted that the
foregoing analysis was to take place in the light of a more general
concern that "the courts should be slow to imply the statutory
prohibition of contracts and should do so only when the implication
is quite clear."52 In adopting this attitude, Devlin J. relied on the
following statement of Lord Wright from Vita Food Products Inc. v.
Unus Shipping Co. Ltd:
5 3
Nor must it be forgotten that the rule by which contracts expressly forbidden by
statute or declared to be void are in proper cases nullified for disobedience to a
statute is a rule of public policy only, and public policy understood in a wider sense
may at times be better served by refusing to nullify a bargain save on serious and
sufficient grounds.
Devlin J. went on to say that "It may be questionable also whether
public policy is well served by driving from the seat of judgment
everyone who has been guilty of a minor transgression."
5 4
In applying these general principles to the facts of St. John
Shipping, Devlin J. indicated the nature and general importance of
the underlying policies in the statute, assessed the adequacy of the
sanctions against this particular form of wrongdoing explicitly set
forth in the statute, and considered the appropriateness of the
unenforceability of contracts of carriage as an additional sanction for
misbehaviour of this kind. Devlin J. noted that he did not regard an
offence against a statute "as a trivial matter, particularly if it is
committed deliberately, and if the safety of lives at sea is involved."-
55
Further, he indicated that the statutory provision of fines did not
provide an adequate disincentive for misconduct inasmuch as the
5 2 Ibid at 691.
5311939] A.C. 277 at 293.
5 4Supra, note 50 at 691.
55Ibid at 685.
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statutory limit of £100 per inch was no longer sufficiently high to
permit the courts to recapture profits secured by the overloading of
ships. Nonetheless, he felt that the imposition of the further
sanction of unenforceability of contracts of carriage was
inappropriate for the following reason:
It is a misfortune for the defendants that the legal weapon which they are wielding
is so much more potent than it need be to achieve their purpose. Believing, rightly
or wrongly, that the plaintiff had deliberately committed a serious infraction of the
Act and one which has placed their property in jeopardy, they wish to do no more
than to take the profit out of his dealing. But the principle which they invoke for
this purpose cares not at all for the element of deliberation or for- the gravity of
the infraction and does not adjust the penalty to the profits unjustifiably earned.
The defendants cannot succeed unless they claim the right to retain the whole
freight and to keep it whether the offence was accidental or deliberate, serious or
trivial. The application of this principle to a case such as this is bound to lead to
startling results.
5 6
Devlin J. went on to illustrate the possible mischief of a rule of this
kind by referring to a number of other statutory contexts in which
contract unenforceability would be a rather draconian response to
particular forms of wrongdoing. Devlin J. did not feel that the
defendants' position would be improved by arguing for a pro rata
reduction of their own obligations to reflect a proportionate share
of the excess profits earned by the plaintiff.5 7  The explanation for
this rejection of what might otherwise seem to be an attractive
solution appears to be that the principle argued for by the
defendants, i.e. that the agreement is unenforceable, would not
provide a basis for a pro rata division of this or any other kind.
The judgment of Devlin J. in St. John Shipping has become
a leading authority, principally because of its straightforward analysis
of underlying policy concerns and its resistance to the widespread
application of illegality doctrine in the context of the modern
regulatory state. Contracts teachers often include excerpts from the
opinion in their teaching materials5 8  and, presumably, offer a
561bid at 686.
571bid at 693-94.
5 8 See, for example, C. Boyle & D.R. Percy, Contracts: Cases and Commentaries, 3d ed.
(Toronto: The Carswell Co. Ltd, 1985); H.G. Beale, W.D. Bishop, M.P. Furmston, Contract:
Cases and Materials (London: Butterworths, 1985) at 635.
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complimentary assessment of the analytical framework set out by
Devlin J. in his reasons for judgment. It may seem churlish to
some, therefore, to suggest that the analysis in St. John Shipping is
less than fully satisfactory. At best, the reasoning is incomplete and
at worst, perhaps, some might think that the case was not, in fact,
correctly decided. The seeds of the problem are revealed by a
comparison of St. John Shipping with the intriguingly similar problem
addressed by the Court of Appeal in Ashmore, Benson, Pease & Co.
Ltd v. A.V Dawson Ltd.59 This was also a case in which a carrier,
in this instance a carrier on land, engaged in a practice of
overloading in breach of the applicable regulatory statute. In this
case, however, the Court of Appeal held that the contract of
carriage was, although lawful in its inception and creation, illegal and
unenforceable because of the illegal mode of performance. The
defendant carrier had contracted to transport a large piece of
engineering equipment manufactured by the plaintiff. When the
equipment was loaded onto the defendant's truck, the total weight
of the load exceeded the amount permitted by statutory regulation
by five tons. Half-way to its destination, the vehicle tipped over
with resulting damage to the equipment. The plaintiff sued the
defendant carrier, alleging that the accident resulted from the
driver's negligence and that the defendants were therefore liable
either in tort or under the contract of carriage for the injury
sustained by the equipment.
The underlying factual pattern of the Ashmore case is thus
similar to that of St. John. There is, however, one distinguishing
feature. At the time of the loading of the equipment, one of the
plaintiffs employees was present and, according to the Court of
Appeal, it must have been evident to this person that the truck was
overloaded. This was held by the Court to constitute a participation
in the illegal mode of performance by the plaintiff. On these facts,
the defendant successfully argued that the illegal mode of
performance rendered the contract illegal and unenforceable and
that the plaintiff's participation in the illegality disabled it from suing
not only on the contract, but in negligence as well.
59119731 1 W.L.R. 828.
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In two very similar cases, then, courts came to different
conclusions. In St. John the agreement was held to be enforceable
and, in Ashmore, it was not. It is of interest for present purposes
to note that when the claim, as in St. John, was for the value of a
service successfully rendered, it was allowed, whereas in Ashmore,
where the claim was not for the value of benefit conferred but for
consequential loss, it was disallowed. One must ask whether the
impulse underlying the analysis in St. John Shipping would not have
been better served by the granting of relief in quantum meruit for
the value of services rendered. It is of interest to speculate whether
the agreement in St. John would have been found by Devlin J. to be
binding in all circumstances. The Ashmore case strongly suggests
that it would not have been. Indeed, it is difficult to believe that a
court would hold the agreement in St. John Shipping binding at an
executory stage if, for example, the owner of the cargo discovered
the overloading at the point of departure and insisted that his goods
be removed from the vessel. If, as seems likely, courts would hold
the agreement illegal and unenforceable when executory but would
still want to allow recovery for the value of services successfully
rendered, the obvious analytical device for accomplishing this
objective is to hold the agreement unenforceable but allow claims in
restitution for the value of services rendered. It may be argued,
then, that the analysis of St. John Shipping is misconceived or, to put
the point more modestly, is incomplete inasmuch as it fails to
consider the possibility of striking down the agreement while still
allowing the carrier to sue for the value of services rendered in
quantum meruit.
Two objections to this attack on St. John may be offered.
First, it may be said that the alleged conflict between St. John and
Ashmore is not as intense as suggested above because of the
knowledge and participation of the plaintiff in the illegal mode of
performance in the Ashmore case. This is not, however, a material
distinction between the two cases. The point of difficulty in each
case is whether a party who is in pari delicto can assert the claim in
question. The plaintiff carrier in St. John and the plaintiff
equipment owner in Ashmore both participated in an illegal mode of
performance. One succeeded in enforcing its claim; the other failed.
If the Ashmore plaintiff had not been a participant in the illegality,
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it is trite that the plaintiff should be able to enforce the agreement.
The point of difficulty that arises in reconciling the two cases is that
the plaintiffs in each instance are in pai delicto.
A second objection that might be taken is that the attack
assumes that, as a general matter, a contract should be determined
to be either enforceable or not, and that this is in some sense too
wooden an approach. Why not say that the contract is enforceable
when the carrier sues to recover his fees, but say that it is not
enforceable when a claim for consequential loss arises? The answer
to this objection, of course, is simply that the concept of intermittent
enforceability is perhaps a conceivable notion, but not one that is
conducive to clear thinking about these questions or predictable
judicial decision-making. We could say that whenever the claim is
essentially one of unjust enrichment, the contract will be enforced.
Yet, even with respect to such claims, would we always want to
enforce the precise terms of the agreement? If the carrier in St.
John Shipping had secured very advantageous payment terms as a
result of which the delay in payment had substantially escalated the
payment obligation, would we wish to give the carrier the advantage
of such terms? I think not. A more attractive analysis of the
relationship, then, would be that the agreement in St. John is
unenforceable but the carrier is nonetheless allowed, for the reasons
advanced by Devlin J., to sue in quantum meruit. It might be added
that, notwithstanding Devlin J.'s views to the contrary, many might
find it attractive to reduce the quantum meruit claim on a pro rata
basis in such a way as to eliminate the plaintiffs ill-gotten gains.
At the very least, then, this is an option that should have received
some consideration in the St. John case.
The explanation for Devlin J.'s failure to consider quantum
reruit as an alternative is interesting. In the following discussion
in which Devlin, J. offers a justification for the general principle that
unlawfully performed contracts are as unenforceable as prohibited
contracts it becomes apparent that Devlin J. is an adherent of the
extreme version of the Holman v. Johnson fallacy:
60
If the prohibited contract is an express one, it falls directly within the principle [that
where the parties have agreed to do something which is prohibited by Parliament,
60See the text at notes 13-20, supra.
808 [YOL. 25 No. 4
1987] Restitutionary Recovery - The New Golden Rule 809
the contract is unenforceable by either party]. It must likewise fall within it if the
contract is implied. If, for example, an unlicensed broker sues for work and labour,
it does not matter that no express contract is alleged and that the claim is based
solely on the performance of the contract, that is to say, the work and labour done;
it is as much unenforceable as an express contract made to fit the work done. The
same reasoning must be applied to a contract which, though legal in form, is
performed unlawfully.
6 1
In the midst of this well-reasoned and, indeed, illuminating
judgment, we thus have a remarkably mechanistic piece of analysis.
Devlin J. argues that just as one cannot sue for quantum meruit for
work performed under a prohibited contract, one cannot sue for the
value of an unlawful performance of an otherwise lawful contract.
Both steps in the analysis are faulty. The major point of this article
is to demonstrate that there is no necessary connection between the
unenforceability of the contract and the inability to recover in
quantum meruit. Indeed, there will be many cases in which sound
policy will dictate that quantum meruit relief will be available
notwithstanding the unenforceability of the contract. Further, there
appears to be no logical connection between the Holman v.
Johnson fallacy and the general principle that unlawfully-performed
agreements are also generally unenforceable.
Given Devlin J.'s apparent assumption that there can be no
relief in quantum meruit where the contract is found to be illegal, it
is not at all surprising that in SA John, he concludes in due course
that the contract is enforceable. For Devlin J., this appears to be
the only device available for avoiding the unattractive conclusion
that the commission of even a trifling offence would result in the
shipowner's inability to collect any of the freight charges for the
voyage in question. Had Devlin J. assumed that quantum meruit
relief might be available, one suspects that he might well have found
the contract to be enforceable.
6 1 Supra, note 50 at 687-88.
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IV. THE CASE FOR THE NEW GOLDEN RULE
A. Introduction
The new golden rule approach to the analysis of
restitutionary claims under illegal agreements requires simply that
the plaintiffs entitlement to the value of what would otherwise be
a windfall for the defendant at his expense be assessed in the light
of the purposes and structure of the statutory scheme or rule
rendering the underlying transaction unenforceable. 62 The court
must consider whether the imposition of the additional sanction of
rendering restitutionary relief unavailable is either necessary or so
highly desirable for the proper implementation of the statutory
policy that the common law's general policy of restoring the value
of benefits conferred under ineffective transactions ought to be
suppressed. As in St. John Shipping,63 it would no doubt be
appropriate for a court to consider whether the sanctions imposed
in the statutory scheme itself constitute so sufficient a disincentive
to unlawful conduct that further sanctions of this kind are not
necessary. A court would also consider whether this particular
sanction is suited to the crime or misconduct in question. As well,
the court would wish to look at such considerations as the relative
fault or immorality manifest in the conduct of the parties, the gravity
of the offence or conflict with the statutory scheme in question, the
extent of the injury to the public interest caused by the particular
transaction, and the degree to which the conferral of a substantial
windfall on the defendant appears to be unacceptable for these or
other reasons.
This section of the article argues for a more explicit
recognition of the golden rule approach and more particularly, for
recognition of the fact that its application may lead, from time to
6 2 Hence the appellation, "golden rule" approach. For a classic exposition of the "golden
rule" approach to statutory interpretation, see J. Willis, "Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell"
(1938) 16 Can. Bar Rev. 1.
6 3 Supra, note 50.
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time, to the granting of restitution to parties who are in pari delicto.
In what follows, an attempt will be made to catalogue a number of
difficulties that appear to be the product of a failure to recognize
the force of this point. As well, it is argued that the golden rule
approach is nonetheless manifest in many aspects of the traditional
doctrine in this area, and has, in recent years, been manifest in a
greater willingness of the courts to ignore the traditional doctrine
and grant restitutionary remedies to plaintiffs who are in pari delicto.
B. Relieving the Pressure on the Unenforceability Rule and
the Exceptions to Holman v. Johnson
It was argued above64 that the case law tends to conclude
that the agreement at issue is enforceable in circumstances where
such a holding is dubious, for the apparent reason that this offers
the only basis for permitting the party in pari delicto to recover the
value of benefits conferred through performance of the agreement.
Indeed, it was suggested that St. John Shipping itself is an illustration
of this phenomenon. These points will not be repeated here but it
is appropriate to emphasize that this distortion of the boundary
between enforceable and unenforceable agreements is a persuasive
reason for straightforwardly recognizing the restitutionary rights of
parties in such circumstances. The unenforceability sanction can
then be left to the work it is suited for, the rendering of executory
portions of the agreement unenforceable and the withholding of the
benefits that would otherwise flow from an action for damages for
breach of contract.
A similar argument can be made with respect to pressures
exerted on the exceptions to Holman v. Johnson65 by the traditional
assumption that a party to an unenforceable agreement can have no
relief unless one of the well-recognized exceptions is applicable.
Thus, where a court is sympathetic to the restitutionary claim of a
party in pai delicto, the temptation exists to expand the exceptions
in such a way as to embrace the particular plaintiff without doing
"Part III, supra.
65Supra, note 13. And see, Part II, supra.
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violence to the general principles underlying the exception at issue.
Two illustrations of this phenomenon are briefly considered here -
the locus poenitentiae exception and the enforcement of collateral
rights - with a view to making two points. First, it is suggested that
this approach leads to complexity and uncertainty concerning the
nature and scope of these exceptions. Second, it is argued that
expansion of the exceptions is not a device that is likely to
successfully resolve the central problem addressed here, the
unavailability of restitutionary relief to the in pai delicto plaintiff.
1. The locus poenitentiae exception
The ambiguities and complexities with which this exception
has become encrusted have been recently and thoroughly canvassed
elsewhere, and it is unnecessary to repeat that analysis here.66 The
important point for present purposes is that to some extent, at least,
these complexities reflect a tension between a tendency to expand
the exception to accommodate more attractive plaintiffs and a
tendency to contract the exception where the plaintiffs are less
attractive. The case law on the question of when "execution" of the
agreement has occurred is illustrative. Consider the following three
leading cases. In Taylor v. Bowers,67 a financially embarrassed
plaintiff had entered into an agreement to transfer his stock in trade
to another in order to defeat his creditors. The stock was delivered
and, indeed, subsequently retransferred to another party, the
defendant, by the first transferee. Prior to the eventual sale by
auction of the debtor's assets, he repudiated the transaction in
question and sought recovery of the stock in trade. In Kearley v.
Thomson,68 the defendants were solicitors who had acted for a
petitioning creditor in bankruptcy proceedings. A friend of the
bankrupt offered to pay for these services, knowing that they would
probably otherwise go unrewarded, in return for an undertaking that
66See R. Merkin, "Restitution by Withdrawal from Executory Illegal Contracts" (1981)
97 L.Q.R. 420.
67(1876), 1 Q.B.D. 291.
69(1890), 24 Q.B.D. 742.
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the solicitors would not attend at the public examination of the
bankrupt and would not oppose his discharge. In the event, the
solicitors did not appear at the public examination but before
discharge the friend sought return of the monies paid in effect as a
bribe to them. In Hermann v. Charlesworth,69 the plaintiff sought
recovery of moneys paid to the defendant marriage broker. A
number of introductions had by then been arranged, but no marriage
had taken place.
If one asked whether in each of these three cases, the
agreement had been "executed" or its purpose had been substantially
accomplished, it is not obvious what the answer should be. In each
case, the plaintiff has done all that was required to be done under
the agreement; the defendant has completed a substantial portion of
the illicit performance and, in each case, the ultimate objective of
the agreement has not yet been achieved. One might expect, then,
that a rule based on a coherent definition of "completion" of the
agreement or its objective would yield the same result in each case.
On the other hand, the golden rule approach would suggest that
some claims are more attractive than others. If the plaintiff is not
allowed to recover in Taylor v. Bowers, it is the other creditors,
rather than the plaintiff, who will pay the price of failure, and a
strong case for recovery is thus made out on policy grounds. In
Kearley v. Thomson, although the correct analysis is not perfectly
obvious, it seems unlikely on policy grounds that we would favour
the recovery of monies paid as a bribe. In Hennann v.
Charlesworth, on the other hand, one can easily articulate the policy
grounds in favour of recovery by the client who now regrets an
arrangement that may be viewed as an exploitative one. Perhaps it
is not surprising, then, that the courts found that there was sufficient
execution to preclude recovery in Kearley v. Thomson but not in
either Taylor v. Bowers or Hermann v. Charlesworth. While the
results of these cases are therefore probably satisfactory to many,
the resultant notion of "execution" is an incoherent one which does
not easily yield to confident application to new fact situations. The
adoption of a new golden rule approach to the analysis of these
cases would substitute for the expansion and contraction of the
69[1905] 2 K.B. 123.
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concept of "execution" a more direct analysis of the merits of the
dispute.
While it would be possible to argue for an expansion of the
notion of "execution"70 as a "second best" solution to the problem
addressed in this article, it should be noted that this path for reform
in the area is a precarious one. Notwithstanding a history of some
leniency in the reported case law, there is likely to be a
countervailing tendency in the courts to reassert the underlying
premise of the exception which is one of protecting parties who are,
in some sense, significantly less morally culpable than the defendant.
This point can be demonstrated by reference to the question
whether a plaintiff can invoke the exception in a case where the
"repentance" has come only after it has become clear that the object
of the agreement has been frustrated by the defendant or by
external events. In the controversial decision in Bigos v. Boustead,71
it was held that the exception would not lie in such circumstances.
The claimant Englishman had entered into an agreement with an
Italian to avoid English currency controls. The Italian was to
provide financial support for the claimant's spouse and child during
a sojourn in Italy in return for repayment of an equivalent amount
in England in English currency. The claimant had pledged securities
to secure the promise of repayment. When, ultimately, the Italian
money was not made available, the claimant sought return of the
security pledged. The court refused recovery on the ground that the
agreement had become frustrated and that the plaintiffs conduct did
not manifest any genuine repentance of the illicit scheme. It is
obvious that a requirement of this kind will limit the scope of the
exception to a very narrow range of cases, and for this and other
reasons, the decision in Bigos v. Boustead has been criticized. 72
Nonetheless, whatever be the ultimate fate of this particular holding,
70See, for example, J.K. Grodecki, "In Pari Delicto Est Conditio Defendentis" (1953) 71
L.Q.R. 254. A sustained critique of the various limits on the notion of execution is to be
found in Merkin, supra, note 66 who concludes at 444 that "the execution exception has done
little to achieve equity" and calls for a general rule favouring the availability of relief as a
preferable device for achieving this objective.
71[1951] 1 All E.R. 92.
72See, for example, Grodecki supra, note 70; Merkin, supra, note 66.
814 [vot. 25 No. 4
1987] Restitutionary Recovery - The New Golden Rule 815
the tendency to restrict the focus of the exception in such a way as
to avoid assisting in pari delicto parties is likely to be an enduring
one as long as the exception is required to peacefully co-exist with
the Holman v. Johnson principle.
2. The enforcement of collateral rights
The illustrations provided above of the enforcement of
collateral rights in contract and property strongly suggest the courts'
willingness to manipulate doctrine in such a way as to secure
indirectly the relief that Holman v. Johnson appears to deny. Thus,
the collateral agreements found to exist in the contracts cases73 are
a transparent, though admirable device for avoiding the harsh
consequences of Holman v. Johnson. They are not, however, the
product of a straightforward attempt to give effect to the contractual
intentions of the parties. The availability of relief which is
dependent upon artfulness of this kind is rather unpredictable.
Similarly the decision in Bowmakers v. Bamet Instruments74
appears to be a somewhat agile application of existing doctrine with
the object of preventing the defendant's enrichment by granting
proprietary relief to the plaintiff. The plaintiff purchased machine
tools and delivered them to the defendant under three separate
hire-purchase agreements. The initial purchase and the agreements
with the defendant were all unenforceable. The defendant stopped
making payments, resold the tools covered by the first and third
agreements to third parties and refused to restore those covered by
the second agreement to the plaintiff. In order to grant relief to
the plaintiff in conversion, it was necessary for the court to assume
that property in the tools had passed to the plaintiff under the
initial agreement and, further, to ignore a particular problem
pertaining to those tools covered by the second agreement. The
7 3 Strongrnan (1945) Ltd v. Sincock, [1955] 2 Q.B. 525; Archbold's (Freightage) Ltd v.
Spanglett Ltd, [1961] 1 Q.B. 374 (C.A.); Munro v. French (1979), 103 D.L.R. (3d) 91 (Sask.
Q.B.). And see the text at note 47, supra. See also, the tort cases referred to in note 49,
supra, in which the courts openly take into account the relative fault of the parties, the gravity
of the wrongdoing and so on in determining to grant or withhold collateral tortious relief.
74[1945] KB. 65 (CA.). And see the text at note 48, supra. See also Belvoir Finance
v. Stapleton, [1970] 3 W.L.R. 530 (C..).
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only possible basis for recovery of those tools that were retained by
the defendant would appear to be non-performance of the illicit
agreement, thus making it difficult to sustain the argument that the
plaintiff is not, in some sense, relying on the illicit agreement in
establishing the proprietary cause of action. Although the decision
has been subjected to criticism on these two grounds, it has also
been stoutly defended, 75 no doubt for the reason that it provides an
avenue for relief in a case where Holman v. Johnson appears to
stand in the way of a straightforward restitutionary claim.
Even if one accepts the Bowmakers line of authority to be
correctly decided, however, it does not offer a satisfactory device for
expanding the scope of relief available to in pai delicto parties.
The availability of relief is dependent on the happenstance of the
manner in which the proprietary aspects of the impugned transaction
have been structured. Thus, if there had been an outright sale to
the defendant in Bowmakers, no relief would be available. Similarly,
the owner of pledged goods would not be able to recover their
value.76 The pattern of relief is thus incoherent. Moreover, the
effect of granting proprietary relief is, of course, to give a priority
over unsecured creditors in the event of an insolvency. This may
often be rather more protection for the in pari delicto plaintiff than
the circumstances warrant. Finally, and this point will be developed
in the next section of the article, the use of proprietary doctrine to
solve what are essentially restitutionary problems will complicate the
already subtle questions relating to the passage of property interests
under illegal agreements.
In summary, then, the evident difficulties that the courts
have experienced in delivering relief in some form to the in pari
delicto plaintiff appear to have distorted both the analysis of the
threshold question of enforceability and the contours of the
7 5 B. Coote, "Another Look at Bowmakers v. Bamett Instruments" (1972) 35 M.L.R. 38.
See also, C.J. Hamson, "Illegal Contracts and Limited Interests" (1949) 10 Camb. LJ. 249.
7 6 Taylor v. Chester (1869), L.R. 4 Q.B. 309, which was distinguished in Bowmakers on the
basis that in Taylor v. Chester, the plaintiff, who had pledged a half-note to the defendant to
secure a debt incurred in return for an immoral consideration, could only defeat the
defendant's reliance on the apparent validity of the pledge by pleading the immoral
consideration. In Bowmakers, it is alleged, it is the defendant who must first raise the illegality
as part of the defence.
816 [vCOi 25 NO. 4
1987] Restitutionary Recovery - The New Golden Rule 817
exceptions to the Holman v. Johnson principle. Straightforward
recognition of the possibility of restitutionary claims would thus
prepare the way for a more coherent analysis of these inter-related
questions.
C. Divorcing Restitutionary Concerns from the Analysis of the Property
Passage Issue
A full assessment of the question of whether property
interests, be they entire or special, can pass under an illegal
agreement is beyond the scope of this article. Nonetheless, brief
treatment must be accorded this issue as it is closely related to the
subject at hand and, moreover, the desirability of divorcing
restitutionary considerations from the analysis of the proprietary
question constitutes yet another reason for plainly admitting of the
possibility of restitutionary claims for parties in pari delicto.
It is now no longer possible, if indeed it ever was, to
confidently describe the position taken by Anglo-Canadian law on
the property passage issue.77  The traditional view combined
"steadfast hands-offism" with a belief that inasmuch as illegal
contracts were a nullity, no property rights could be created by
them. Neither party, including the true owner, could invoke the
assistance of the courts in enforcing proprietary rights. 78 Thus, the
traditional view assumes that in the case of an illegal lease, for
example, though no enforceable interest will pass to the lessee, the
landlord will not be able to bring an action to eject a tenant in
7 7 See, generally, MJ. Higgins, "The Transfer of Property under Illegal Transactions"
(1962) 25 M.L.R. 149; J.W.Wade, "Legal Status of Property Transferred under an Illegal
Transaction" (1946) 41 I1. L. Rev. 487.
78The traditional view is set out, for example, in M.P. Furmston, ed., Cheshire, Fifoot
and Furnston's Law of Contract, 11th ed. (London; Butterworths, 1986) at 359-65, where
authorities inconsistent with this view are dismissed as "contrary to the established principles"
or "dubious." For less dogmatic accounts, see for example, G.H. Treitel, The Law of Contract,
6th ed. (London: Stevens & Sons, 1983) at 375-79; S.M. Waddams, The Law of Contracts, 2d
ed. (Toronto; Canada Law Book Inc., 1984) at 428-30.
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possession. 79 On the other hand, there is a modern line of
authority,80 which draws some support from earlier authority,81 to
the effect that property interests do pass under illegal contracts
either by delivery of possession or, as was held in Belvoir Finance v.
Stapleton,82 through execution of the agreement itself. In the
leading case, Singh v. Ali,83 the Privy Council held that property
would pass under an agreement for the sale of a lorry
notwithstanding the fact that the parties intended to deceive the
transport authorities by retaining registration of the vehicle in the
seller's name. The seller had subsequently retaken possession of the
vehicle and the purchaser was allowed a claim in trespass. Even a
cursory examination of the underlying policy considerations reveals
much to be said in favour of the passage of property interests. It
avoids the creation of unenforceable interests in property which will
nonetheless have the effect of making further transfer of the
property difficult if not impossible. It would avoid the prejudice
that would otherwise result to third parties who innocently purchase
such property. It would eliminate any incentive to self-help
remedies and the possibilities for violent encounters thereby
entailed.
And yet, a rule that property invariably passes is also
unattractive. It may be appropriate that items of property such as
burglary tools be rendered derelict under the traditional approach.
One would not, in any event, expect the courts to utilize their
79Feret v. Hill (1854), 15 C.B. 207; Alexander v. Rayson, [1936] 1 K.B. 169 (C.A.). And
see, Furmston, ibid. at 363-64, and, for a discussion of Feret v. Hil4 at 372-73. It is assumed,
however that the landlord can recover the land after expiration of the term of the lease.
Some have characterized this situation as one in which the tenant obtains, in effect, a
possessory interest or perhaps, a leasehold interest for the term. See, for example, Treitel,
ibid. at 377; Waddams, ibid. at 429.
8 0See Singh v. Ali, [1960] A.C. 167 (P.C.); Bowmakers v. Barnett Instruments, [1945] K.B.
65 (C.A.); Belvoir Finance v. Stapleton, [1970] 3 W.L.R. 530 (CA).
8 1See, for example, Scarfe v. Morgan (1838), 4 M. & W. 270; Taylor v. Chester (1869),
L.R. 4 Q.B. 309. And see, Higgins, supra, note 77.
82[1970] 3 W.LR. 530 (CA).
8311960] AC. 167 (P.C.).
[voL- 25 NO. 4
1987] Restitutionary Recovery - The New Golden Rule 819
resources in adjudicating disputes concerning such items. Further,
the nature of the illegality or immorality may be such as to render
it inappropriate for the courts to facilitate the transfer in any way.
Perhaps many would agree that the sale of a house of ill-fame to a
purchaser who eagerly anticipates building on the reputation of his
predecessor in title comes within this category.8 4 As well, it is
possible that, in a particular case, a holding that property has passed
will frustrate the underlying objective of the rule that has rendered
the transaction unenforceable. Thus, where the very purpose of the
statutory scheme in question is to prevent the transfer from taking
place, it would be perverse for a court to hold that although the
transaction is itself unenforceable, property nonetheless passes to the
purchaser. The decision of the Privy Council in Kalubya v. Singh85
provides an illustration. There, the transfer of certain protected
"Mailo" lands without the requisite statutory consent was held
ineffective. It may well be wondered whether similar concerns
should not have been weighed more carefully in Singh v. Ali and in
the Bowmakers v. Barnett Instruments line of authority.8 6 Finally,
there may be cases where the withholding of property passage will
be thought to act as an appropriate disincentive to wrongful
conduct
8 7
In short, a rule holding either that property does or that it
does not pass as a matter of general principle is plainly
8 4 But see Clark v. Hagar (1893), 22 S.C.R. 510 (purchase price included component for
"goodwill" - mortgage held enforceable). An attractive solution in such cases would be to
withhold relief from the immediate parties who acquire interests from the transferee to
enforce them. Gvynne . appeared to consider this to be a possible result. See ibid. at 527-
28.
85[1964] A-C. 142 (P.C.).
8 6In both cases, the regulatory scheme had, as one of its objectives, the prevention of a
transfer of title without the requisite approval. There is at least a respectable argument,
therefore, that a withholding of property passage would be more consistent with the statutory
scheme in each case. On the other hand, it would be reasonable to conclude, consistent with
the result in these cases, that this concern is not so grave as to outweigh the policies against
encouraging self-help remedies and against creating effectively inalienable property which
favour a holding that property has passed. But see further, the discussion in note 89, infra.
8 7Transfers under agreements infected by some fraudulent scheme of the purchaser's, for
example, may warrant such treatment.
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unsatisfactory. It is therefore not surprising that although each of
these conflicting general principles is embraced to some extent in
the case law, neither has attracted universal support. Further,
although an elaborate defence of this position will not be attempted
here, it seems apparent that a new golden rule approach to the
analysis of proprietary issues that brings into explicit consideration
the policy issues adverted to above would be considerably more
fruitful than the approaches taken to this problem in the
jurisprudence to date.88 The point to be made for present purposes
is, however, a more limited one. It is evident that in the absence of
any possibility of direct restitutionary rights for in pari delicto parties,
courts will be tempted to manipulate property passage rules in such
a way as to facilitate some form of relief. Such considerations have
the unsatisfactory effect of complicating the analysis of proprietary
questions, distracting attention from the proper purpose of
proprietary analysis, the determination of the proprietary rights of
the parties inter se, and the effect, in proprietary terms, of their
conduct on third parties. There are doubtless cases, and Singh v.
Al 8 9 may be one of them, in which it is appropriate to grant
restitution but deny the effectiveness of the transfer.
Straightforward recognition of the potential restitutionary claim of
an in pari delicto party would remove the temptation to hold that a
transfer has occurred in order to create a device for depriving the
88Professor Wade offered a similar analytical model ostensibly as a means for accounting
for the results in the decided cases. See J.W. Wade, supra, note 77.
89[1960] A-C. 167 (P.C.). And see the discussion in note 86, supra. If the court in Singh
had felt itself able to withhold property passage but, at the same time, allow the purchaser
to bring a restitutionary claim for the price paid (subject to a counterclaim for the value of
user enjoyed), this might have been considered to be a result which more satisfactorily
implemented a desire to prevent the seller's unjust enrichment without, in so doing,
undermining an important objective of the statutory scheme. A similar analysis could be
offered of Bowmakers v. Bamett Instruments, [1945] K.B. 65 (C.A.). No doubt however, if such
an approach were considered in Singh, the court would very likely have concluded that
Holmnan v. Tohnson precluded restitutionary relief for the purchaser (or the seller). It may
well be, therefore, that the decision to allow property to pass was motivated by a desire to
employ what appeared to be the only available means to prevent the unjust enrichment of the
seller. The point being made here, however, is not that these cases were necessarily
incorrectly decided, but rather that the restitutionary and proprietary issues ought to be
rendered independent of each other by recognizing more clearly that restitutionary relief may
be available in cases such as these.
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transferor of a windfall gain. Similarly, it would remove the
temptation to hold that property has not passed where that seems to
be the only available device for affording relief of some kind to the
transferor.
D. Deciding Like Cases in Like Fashion
The Holman v. Johnson principle and its corollaries and
exceptions have a remarkable capacity for generating anomalous
results. Indeed, this area of the law is unique in the sense that it
is riddled with anomalous holdings, and quite content to tolerate
what appear to be indefensible differences in the treatment of
similar fact situations. This may be thought by some to be the very
point of Holman v. Johnson and its underlying assumption that the
courts should, by refusing intervention on behalf of plaintiffs as a
class, allow the existing distribution of gains and losses to lie
undisturbed regardless of the potential injustice to the parties. The
result of this approach, however, is the toleration of outcomes that
have little similarity from one case to the next and the infliction of
losses randomly on persons whose degree of wrongdoing ranges from
trivial and accidental misconduct at one end of the scale, to serious
crime at the other end. In determining whether a loss is to be
inflicted in a particular case, the critical factor may simply be the
manner in which performance of the agreement has been
scheduled,90 or the nature of the arrangements made for the giving
or taking of security,91 or, indeed, the mode of payment chosen by
the parties.92 In many cases, such differences will appear accidental
and irrelevant to the merits of the dispute with the result that the
pattern of outcomes generated has an illogical and incoherent
appearance.
90This follows from the general principle that once conferred, benefits are generally
irrecoverable. Distinctions drawn on this basis are also inherent in the operation of the locus
poenitentiae exception, discussed above in the text at notes 36 and 66-72, supra.
91See the discussion of Bowmakers v. Bamett Instruments in the text at note 76, supra.
92 See, further, the text at notes 93-97, infra.
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A fine illustration of this capacity for inconsistency can be
found in the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Steinberg
v. Cohen.93 In that case, the plaintiff had paid money and given a
chattel mortgage to secure a further payment in return for an
undertaking by the defendant to stifle the prosecution of a third
party. The plaintiff had reason to fear that he might ultimately be
implicated himself and prosecuted separately. The plaintiff sought
recovery of the monies paid and cancellation of the mortgage. After
a lengthy and careful review of the applicable authorities, the Court
of Appeal ordered that the security be set aside, but refused
recovery of the money paid. The Court was not "unmindful that at
first sight it may seem inconsistent that two different results should
accrue from the one corrupt agreement" but felt that any
inconsistency was "more apparent than real" and that, in any event,
"if there is any real inconsistency, anomalous results are not
unknown in our law."94 Notwithstanding this protest, a holding that
the plaintiff is sufficiently in pari delicto so as to be precluded from
recovering the payment, but sufficiently not in pari delicto to permit
cancellation of the mortgage, does not appear to have a firm basis
in public policy or, indeed, in common sense. Little comfort can
be drawn from Orde J.A.'s further suggestion that if, instead of a
chattel mortgage, a negotiable security such as a bond or debenture
had been delivered, "such a security might well stand in the same
category as money paid."95
Similar differences in the treatment of different modes of
payment surfaced in Menard v. Genereux,96  a recent Ontario
decision in which Krever J., as he then was, concluded that monies
paid under an illicit scheme were irrecoverable, but that a negotiable
instrument executed by the payer would be unenforceable. As a
result, the payer would effectively be relieved from this obligation.
It is of interest in the present context that Krever J. went on to
9311930] 2 D.L.R. 916 (Ont. C.A.).
9 41bid. at 928-29 per Masten J.A.
951biaL at 929 per Orde J.A.
96(1982), 39 O.R. (2d) 55 (H.C.).
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express the view that the circumstances of this case were such that
any enrichment of the defendant at the plaintiffs expense would be
unjust, and he lamented the fact that no direct claim in restitution
appeared to be available to the plaintiff. Krever 3. was relieved to
note, however, that a result consistent with his views and with the
effective release of the plaintiff's obligations on the instrument could
be achieved by virtue of the fact that the monies paid were still in
the hands of the solicitors for the parties. As neither party could
assert a claim to the monies under the impugned agreement, the
solicitors would appear to be obliged, on resulting trust principles,
to restore the monies to the plaintiff.97 Had the monies been paid
over to the defendant already, they would be beyond reach. If
justice did in the end triumph in Krever J.'s view however, it is
surely nonetheless an embarrassment to our doctrine in this area
that a sensible result was achieved only by such accidental means.
These and other illustrations that might be offered provide
support for the view that some evolution of doctrine in this area is
overdue. It is evidently the case that an open recognition of the
possibility of direct restitutionary claims for in pari delicto plaintiffs
will eliminate some of the difficulty. An even more fundamental
problem is revealed by a careful reading of the cases. A principal
source of our difficulty in analyzing these problems is a tendency to
over-generalize in these matters. It would be surprising if a general
rule of broad application could consistently resolve the main
difficulties generated by agreements in conflict with public policy.
Cases dealing with such varied phenomena as major crime, work
done by unlicensed plumbers, Sunday contracts, and lending
agreements in which the date of the loan has been carelessly
omitted, do, after all, have some material differences. It is obviously
necessary to develop a more contextually specific approach to the
analysis of these problems. It is precisely this type of analysis that
is suggested in St. John Shipping98 with respect to the enforceability
issue, and here with respect to the restitutionary and proprietary
issues. If like cases are to be decided in like fashion - and there
97Ibid at 73.
9 8 [1956] 3 All E.R. 683 (Q.B.), discussed in the text at notes 50-61, supra.
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appears to be no compelling reason not to aspire to this lofty
objective here, as elsewhere - an analytical method that renders
these contextual differences material must be adopted.99
E. The Moneylenders Act Cases
Readers who are familiar with the series of English decisions
under the Moneylenders Acts of 190000 and 1927101 may find the
prospect of a reconsideration of these authorities a somewhat
chilling one. Nonetheless, there are a number of reasons why it
may be useful to rake these old chestnuts (and their offspring) over
the coals one more time in the present context.
First, the Moneylenders Act cases appear to be the only line
of English authority that explicitly attempts to afford some
protection to the guilty party, and it is important to note how
limited and unsatisfactory a solution has been developed in these
cases. Second, a close look at the Moneylenders Act cases cannot
fail to assist the case for reform. The Moneylenders Act cases are
the reductio ad absurdum of the illegality case law. The results
achieved in the modern cases are simply outlandish. For example,
in one case, a commercial borrower was allowed to resist repayment
of monies advanced on the ground that the parties had failed to
record in a written agreement the date on which the money was
advanced.10 2 The agreement fully complied with the legislation in
all other respects. Nonetheless, the English courts have resisted any
modification of the traditional rules that would avoid such harsh and
indefensible consequences.
99In Steinberg v. Cohen, supra, note 93, Masten J.A. commented to similar effect as
follows, at 928: "It is possible that each case should depend on its own facts, and upon a
balancing by the court of the public interest on the one hand and of the private injustice on
the other."
'OOMoneylenders Ac 1900, (U.C), 63 & 64 Vict. c. 51.
1 0 1 Moneylenders Act 1927, (U.K.), 17 & 18 Geo. 5 c. 21.
102Barclay v. Prospect Mortgages Lid, [1974] 2 All E.R. 672 (Ch. D.). And see, Orakpo
v. Manson Investments Ltd, [1978] A.C. 95 (H.L.).
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Third, although it would be appropriate to confine the
influence of these decisions to the very specific and narrow context
of the English moneylending legislation, these decisions appear to
have had a broader influence than this, and, more importantly for
present purposes, they appear to have enjoyed some support in the
Canadian jurisprudence. Accordingly, the present treatment is
offered, in part, as an exercise in exorcism.
1. The old cases
The English legislation is uncomplicated and transparent in
purpose. The Act of 1900 has three principal features. Section 1
confers a power on the courts to re-open and reform moneylending
transactions found to be harsh and unconscionable. Section 2
establishes a registration scheme for moneylenders. A moneylender
who fails to register under the Act or who carries on business other
than in his registered name is exposed, under sub-section 2, to
criminal sanctions including a fine and, for repeat offenders,
imprisonment. Section 4 creates an offence of fraudulent induce-
ment of moneylending transactions.
The Moneylenders Act, 1927 introduced two features of
interest in the present context. First, the section 2 registration
scheme of the 1900 Act was replaced by a more elaborate licensing
scheme in section 1 of the 1927 Act. Section 1(3) of that Act
establishes a regime of criminal sanctions for the carrying on of a
moneylending business without a license that is similar in all respects
to the penalties imposed in section 2(2) of the 1900 Act for non-
registration.
Secondly, section 6 of the 1927 Act introduces formal
requirements for moneylending contracts. Section 6(1) stipulates
that:
no contract for the repayment by the borrower money lent to him ... and no
security given by the borrower ... in respect of any such contract shall be
enforceable, unless a note or memorandum in writing of the contract be made and
signed personally by the borrower, and unless a copy thereof be delivered or sent
to the borrower within seven days of the making of the contract....
Section 6(2) further stipulates that the note or memorandum must
contain "all the terms of the contract" and, more particularly, must
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contain the date of the loan, the amount advanced, and the rate of
interest as a percentage per annum of the principal.
The restitutionary issues that have become troublesome in
the case law are first, whether an unlicensed moneylender can
recover the amount of principal advanced, even though the lending
of money without a licence constitutes an offence, and secondly,
whether monies advanced under a transaction that has not adopted
the requisite form can be recovered, notwithstanding the
unenforceability of the agreement itself. The Act is silent on both
of these points.
Although none of the case law decided under the Acts has
suggested that a direct right of recovery should be available in either
circumstance, the first of the leading cases, Lodge v. National Union
Investment Co. Ltd,103 offers support for the view that borrowers
seeking relief from their obligations in reliance on the provisions of
the Acts might be required, as a condition of their relief, to repay
the amount of principal advanced. Notwithstanding the considerable
attention this problem set has attracted in the case law since Lodge,
the central question of the extent to which this "passive" protection
of the moneylender is available remains, to some extent, unresolved.
The dispute in Lodge itself arose from the fact that the
defendant moneylender, from whom the plaintiff borrowed money,
had not registered its name under the 1900 Act. This conduct
constituted an offence under the Act, and the transaction was stated
by Parker J. to be "void for illegality."1°4 The loan was secured by
a mortgage of the borrower's reversion interest in certain
investments and also by the assignment to the defendant of a life
insurance policy taken out on the life of the borrower. The
documentation of the mortgage was unusual. The borrower had
executed an absolute assignment of his reversion interest. A
separate letter was signed by the defendant clearly indicating that
the transaction was intended as a mortgage. In addition, the
borrower's obligation to repay was documented in two bills of
exchange in favour of the moneylender drawn upon and accepted by
10311904-7] All E.R. Rep. 333 (Ch. D.).
1041bid at 335.
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the borrower. When these instruments fell due in February 1906,
the borrower, upon payment of £150 to the defendant, was granted
an extension of the time for repayment. Two new bills of exchange
were given and the old ones were cancelled. Upon learning that
the defendant had not registered itself under the Act, the borrower
brought this action seeking a declaration that the transaction was
illegal and void, delivery up from the defendant of the two bills of
exchange and the two assignments, and recovery of the £150 as
money had and received.
Parker J. said that the normal rule in the case of transactions
void for illegality was that "neither party can take any proceedings
against the other party for the restoration of any property or for the
repayment of any money which has been transferred or paid in the
course of illegal transactions,"105  but noted that there was an
exception in favour of "persons for whose protection the illegality of
the contract has been created." Accordingly, the borrower was able
to seek the assistance of the court in this action. It was also his
view, however, that the granting of the relief requested should be
conditional upon the borrower's willingness to repay the money
borrowed. For Parker J. it seemed "reasonably clear that, at any
rate, in equity, if not also at law, a person taking advantage of the
exception arising from the fact that he belongs in the class for
whose protection the statutes were passed could not assert any right
unless he himself was prepared to do what the court considered fair
to the defendant," fairness here requiring that the price of being
relieved from the obligation to pay interest and being granted
delivery up of the documents should be the repayment of the
monies advanced by the defendant. Although the moneylender
would have no standing to bring an active claim for the recovery of
these monies, the proposition put forward by Parker J. affords
"1passive" entitlement to the recovery of monies lent in the event
that it becomes necessary for the borrower to bring an action against
the moneylender.
Support for this view on the equity side was drawn by Parker
J. from the maxim that he who seeks equity must do equity and
from cases decided under the old usury laws holding that borrowers
105 bid. at 335.
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seeking delivery up of usurious securities would be required to repay
the monies borrowed as a condition of obtaining such relief. The
position at Common Law was, Parker J. conceded, less certain.
Nonetheless, he was able to draw support from a decision of Lord
Mansfield in Fitzroy v. Gwillim,10 6 in which a pawner who brought
an action in trover against a pawn broker to recover the pledged
goods was obliged, as a condition of obtaining relief, to repay the
monies borrowed from the latter. It was true, Parker J.
acknowledged,10 7 that subsequent cases had doubted Fitzroy v.
Gwillim, but, nevertheless, it was Parker J.'s view that such
conditions could still be imposed at common law in an action for
trover or detinue in any case where the plaintiff borrower found it
necessary, in the particular circumstances of the case, to rely on the
illegality of the transaction to establish entitlement to such relief.
This would be the case in Lodge itself, for example, where the
absolute nature of the assignments made it necessary for the
borrower to advert to the illegal nature of the transaction.108
Having expressed a preference for this view, however, Parker
3. went on to observe that it was unnecessary for him to decide this
point inasmuch as the relief sought in the present case, apart from
the common law claim in money had and received for the £150, was
equitable in nature. As far as the claim in money had and received
was concerned Parker . relied on Lord Mansfield's often quoted
statement in Moses v. Macferlan109 to the effect that this claim,
though common law in origin, is equitable in nature and "lies only
for money which, ex aequo et bono, the defendant ought to
refund. 110 Parker 3. did not think that it was "either aequum or
bonum that the plaintiff who has had the benefit of the [monies
106(1786), 1 Term Rep. 153, 99 E.R. 1025.
07Supra, note 103 at 336.
108 Parker, . doubted that trover or detinue would lie in Lodge, however, as he did not
"see how there was ever in the plaintiff any property or right to possession of these
documents' !bid at 337.
109(1760), 2 Burr. 1005 at 1012.
110Supra, note 103 at 337.
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advanced] ..., is relying on the illegality of the contract, wants his
money, and cannot get it except under the exception, should recover
it without being put on terms which both parties may be restored to
the positions they occupied before the transaction.
111
This passive protection of the restitutionary interest of the
moneylenders affected by Lodge is not, of course, a perfect or ideal
solution to their restitutionary problem. Relief is contingent on the
happenstance of the borrower needing to come forward to the
courts for relief of some kind. Presumably, there would be many
borrowers who do not need to retrieve a security and who would be
content to let sleeping dogs lie and refuse to repay their loans,
secure in the knowledge that the moneylender cannot sue to enforce
the obligation to repay. The rule in Lodge's case is therefore
vulnerable to the critique that it leads to an anomalous pattern of
remedies. Its appeal, on the other hand, must be that it does at
least afford some measure of relief to the lender and, in so doing,
employs an analytical device that avoids direct conflict with Holnan
v. Johnson.
Lodge's case was, however, narrowly distinguished rather than
applied in subsequent cases. In the case of Chapman v.
Michaelson,1 1 2 which arose a year later, the defendant moneylender
was carrying on the business of moneylending otherwise than in his
registered name and thus in contravention, as in Lodge's case, of
section 2 of the 1900 Act. The borrower sought a declaration that
the mortgage given to the defendant was illegal and void. The
moneylender sought to rely on Lodge's case and condition relief on
the repayment of the monies advanced without interest. The Court
of Appeal, upholding a decision of the trial judge to the same
effect, granted the declaration requested but refused to impose
terms of this kind on the borrower. The "simple answer" to the
attempt to rely on Lodge's case, according to Cozens-Hardy M.R.,
was that "this is not equitable relief.,113 Although the claim had in
fact been brought in the Chancery Division, this was said to been a
1111bid. at 338.
112[1909] 1 Ch. 238 (CA.).
ll31bid, at 242.
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mere accident inasmuch as the declaration sought by the borrower
was one that could have been granted by a Court of Common Law.
A distinction was thus set up between relief available only at Equity,
with respect to which terms can be imposed, and Common Law
relief with respect to which they cannot. The arguments advanced
by Parker J. in Lodge's case in support of the view that terms could
be imposed at Common Law as well were neither mentioned nor
discussed in Chapman v. Michaelson.
It may be of more than passing interest to note that it was
conceded on behalf of the moneylender that the transaction was
"grossly usurious."114  Presumably, it was this fact that Fletcher
Moulton L.J. had in mind when he said, "I am not going to express
any general opinion as to the propriety of imposing terms in such
cases, but I think that in the circumstances of this case no terms
ought to have been imposed. 'ta15 His Lordship went on to observe
that the considerations that might apply in a case of "true equitable
relief do not necessarily apply to an action for a mere declaration of
rights." It would thus be possible to read Chapman as authority for
the proposition that it is appropriate to take into account the
exploitative nature of the transaction in deciding whether to impose
terms on the borrower, at least in a case where the remedy is one
which could have been obtained at Common Law. Such an
approach would involve an attractive balance of the statute's
consumer protection objectives with a general policy of normally
requiring that the monies borrowed be returned to the moneylender.
This approach surely could have been extended to cases involving
truly equitable relief. That has not been the fate of Chapman,
however. The case has been interpreted as support for the view
that terms can be imposed only in cases where relief was available
exclusively in Equity. This view carries with it, of course, the
unfortunate consequence that much will turn on the proper
characterization of the origin of the remedy in question.
1141bid. at 241.
115 1bid. at 242.
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An equally unsatisfactory distinction from Lodge was
developed in the later decision in Cohen v. Lester.1 6 In this case,
the plaintiff borrower sought delivery up of jewellery deposited with
a moneylender as security for the loan and of promissory notes
evidencing the repayment obligation. The defendant moneylender
conceded that the lending documents did not fully disclose all of the
terms of the arrangement and that the loans were therefore
unenforceable by virtue of section 6 of the 1927 Act. Nonetheless,
the defendant sought to invoke Lodge's case and argued that the
granting of relief to the plaintiff should be conditioned on an
obligation to repay the monies advanced. The plaintiff successfully
argued, howe ,er, that Lodge's case should not apply to a case in
which the transaction is determined by theAct to be "unenforceable"
rather than "illegal and void" (presumably, in the sense that the
impugned transaction involves the commission of an offence under
the Act). Section 6(1) of the Act provides that "No contract for the
repayment by a borrower of money lent to him ... and no security
given by the borrower ... shall be enforceable...." By way of contrast,
it was apparently said (though this is not quite true) that section 2
of the 1900 Act "expressly stated" that agreements entered into in. ,,117
breach of its provisions are "illegal. It is only where the
transaction is "illegal," the Court held, that the moneylender is
entitled to the benefit of the condition that the loan be repaid as
the price of the plaintiff's relief.
The rationale for this holding cannot be obvious. As others
have observed, this approach leads to the absurdity that "from the
moneylender's point of view it was better to commit an offense and
make an illegal loan than to commit no offence and make a loan
that was merely unenforceable."118  The explanation offered by
Tucker J. was that the moneylender, in attempting to insist on
116[1939] 1 KB. 504, [1938] 4 All E.R. 188.
117 1bid. at 191 (All E.R.). This passage is not reproduced in the KB. report. Section
2 of the 1900 Act creates an offence of carrying on business, including the entering of lending
agreements, "otherwise than in his registered name," but does not speak directly on the status
of such agreements.
1 1 8 Note, (1956), 72 L.Q.R. 480 (R.E. Megarry).
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repayment of the monies advanced as a condition of releasing the
security was "doing the very thing which section 6 says cannot be
done - that is, he is seeking to enforce a contract which the statute
has said shall be unenforceable."119 The patent absurdity, in policy
terms, of this method of distinguishing Lodge's case appears to have
escaped Tucker J.'s attention.
At this point, then, the position appeared to be that
moneylenders would gain the passive entitlement afforded by Lodge's
case only if (i) the relief sought by the borrower were truly
equitable in nature and, (ii) the applicable provision of the Acts
rendered the transaction "illegal" rather than "unenforceable." This
was the unsatisfactory state of the law when the Privy Council
addressed a very similar question in Kasumu v. Baba-Egbe.
1 20
This case arose under a Nigerian moneylenders ordinance
which contained provisions similar but not identical to section 6 of
the 1927 Act. Section 19 of the Ordinance required that certain
written records be maintained concerning loans and then stipulated
in subsection 4 as follows:
(iv) any moneylender who fails to comply with any of the requirements of this
section shall not be entitled to enforce any claim in respect of any transaction in
relation to which the default shall have been made. He shall also be guilty of an
offence under this ordinance.... (emphasis added).
Two material differences from section 6 may be noted. First, the
phrase "any claim" may be thought to be considerably broader than
the stipulation in section 6 that the contract for repayment and the
security given are "unenforceable." Second, section 19 confounds
the possibility of applying the illegality/unenforceability distinction, as
it also renders the failure to keep appropriate written records an
offence.
The facts of Kasumu are similar to those of the cases
previously discussed with the added complication that the
moneylender who had taken a mortgage on the borrower's premises,
had, upon the borrower's default, gone into possession of the
premises and received rents and profits from that occupation. The
1 19Supra, note 116 at 193 (All E.R.) and, to similar effect, at 507 (KB.).
120[1956] A. 539 (P.C.).
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borrower brought an action seeking delivery up of the mortgage
documents, repossession of the premises, and recovery of the rents
and profits. The West African Court of Appeal had granted such
relief and, unlike the trial judge, had refused to apply Lodge and
require repayment of the principal amount of the mortgage. In the
Privy Council, the moneylender's attempt to invoke Lodge also
failed. Lord Radcliffe was unstinting in his criticism of Lodge and
the distinctions developed in Chapman and Cohen. With respect to
Lodge, he suggested that reliance on the cases decided under the
Usury Acts was misconceived inasmuch as the underlying moral
concern with respect to usury tainted both borrower and lender,
whereas it was clearly only the moneylenders' conduct that was the
subject of concern and regulation in the Moneylenders Acts.
Moreover, he was of the view that a general rule requiring
repayment of monies as a condition of "any order for relief' would
mean the adoption of a policy "in direct conflict with the policy of
the Acts."121 The distinction advanced in Cohen v. Lester between
illegal and unenforceable contracts was criticized on the basis that
it affords more favourable treatment to a moneylender who has
committed an offence than to one who has merely entered an
unenforceable agreement. The distinction advanced in Chapman v.
Michaelson between purely equitable relief and common law
remedies did not, in his Lordship's view "seem a very satisfactory
basis for a material difference in the resulting positions of lender
and borrower."
1 22
Notwithstanding this withering attack on the earlier cases,
Lord Radcliffe refrained from actually stating that Lodge's case was
wrongly decided or ought not be followed. Indeed he said that
"Lodge's case was a decision of a great equity lawyer and it has
stood as a decision since the year 1906,t123 and contented himself
with the observation that it "cannot be treated as having established
any wide general principle that governs the action of courts in
granting relief in moneylending cases." This, together with the fact
1 2 1 1id. at 522.
1 2 2 1bid. at 550.
1 2 3 1bid. at 549.
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that Lord Radcliffe, rooting his opinion in a close reading of the
language of section 19, held that the imposition of a requirement of
repayment would constitute "a claim in respect of the transaction,
124
leaves open the possibility that Lodge's case may properly be
considered to have survived this searching critique. Surprisingly,
perhaps, this indeed appears to be the prevailing view of the matter.
The explanation for this may well be that the courts are reluctant to
reach the conclusion that there should be no prospect whatsoever of
the borrower being required to repay. Moreover, for all its critical
force, the decision in Kasumu does not offer persuasive reasons for
Lord Radcliffe's assumption that the unenforceability of the
moneylending contract carries with it the necessary inference that
the borrower must be allowed to retain the monies advanced.
2. The old cases received in Canada
Canadian courts appear to have taken a less critical approach
to the English case law than did Lord Radcliffe in Kasumu. In a
number of Canadian cases, Lodge's case and its successors have been
referred to on the assumption that they represent a statement of
valid principle.! 25 The most extensive discussion of the English
decisions is found in the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal
in Sidnay v. Wettham Investments Ltd126 which in turn, appears to
have had a substantial influence in subsequent Canadian cases.
1 27
This case involved a rather substantial mortgage loan advanced by a
124 1bid. at 551.
125 See, for example, Gyurcsek v. Eng (1977), 2 B.C.L.R. 12; Chambers v. Pennyfartiing
(1983), 43 B.C.LR. 262; Cano Projects Ltd v. Corrales (1985), 64 B.C.L.R. 218 (C.A.); Haug
& Nellermore v. Murdoch (1916), 26 D.L.R. 200 (Sask.).
126(1967), 61 D.LR. (2d) 358, affd on appeal; (1968), 69 D.L.R. (2d) 336 (S.C.C.).
12 7The case has been referred to subsequently on numerous occasions both for its
discussion of the enforceability issue and of the consequences of illegality. See, for example,
CMH.C v. Mabie (1969), 1 N.B.R. (2d) 260; Rogers v. Leonard (1973), 1 O.R. (2d) 57
(H.C.); CM.H.C v. Co-operative College Residences Inc. et al. (1975), 13 O.R. (2d) 394 (C.A.);
Munro v. French (1979), 10 R.P.R. 179 (Sask. Q.B.); Rosemary v. Nuberg and Dale
Construction (1982), 40 O.R. (2d) 152 (Div. Ct.); White Motor Credit Corp. of Canada Ltd v.
Valley Equipment Ltd (1983), 48 N.B.R. (2d) 157.
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private company carrying on the business of a mortgage broker.
The borrower alleged that the lending of money on the security of
real estate constituted the carrying on of the business of a loan and
trust corporation and accordingly, that the lender, having neglected
to register himself in accordance with section 133(1) of the Loan
and Trust Corporations Act,128 had committed an offence. The result
of this, it was argued, was that the mortgage in question was illegal
and void. The lender argued that its lending business had not
brought it within the reach of the Loan and Trust Corporations Act
and, in the alternative, argued that even if it had, the commission of
a section 133 offence did not carry with it the implication that any
lending transactions entered into were themselves illegal. In the
further alternative, it argued that if the transactions were illegal, at
the very least, Lodge's 29 case could be invoked so as to ensure that
the borrower would be required to restore the principal monies
advanced by the lender as a condition of obtaining an order
declaring the transaction null and void. The Court of Appeal
decided, and was affirmed on this point by the Supreme Court of
Canada, that the statute did not reach privately controlled
corporations such as the defendant who, although it did indeed
engage in the business of lending money on the security of
mortgages, did not otherwise carry on the business of a loan or trust
corporation. Although a literal construction of the Act would
appear to capture individuals engaged in such a lending business, the
intent of the statute was to regulate the activities of corporations
that raise monies from a wide clientele of depositors, debenture
holders, and other creditors for the purpose of lending money to the
public. The object of the legislation is to afford some measure of
protection to those who entrust their monies to a loan or trust
corporation.
The carefully reasoned judgment of the court on this point
is reminiscent of the decision in St. John Shipping130 in two respects.
128R.S.O. 1960, c. 222, s. 133(1), now s. 174(3) of R.S.O. 1980, c. 249.
129Supra, note 103.
130[1956] 3 All E.R. 683 (Q.B.). For a discussion of SL John Shipping see the text at
notes 50-61, supra.
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First, it constitutes a thoughtful elaboration of legislative purpose in
aid of a careful delineation of the scope of the statute and it avoids
the traditional hazard of assuming that the coverage of the statute
is broader than is required by the objectives of the statutory scheme.
Secondly, however, one cannot resist wondering whether the court
in Sidmay, like the St. John Shipping court, was not pushed in the
direction of finding the agreement to be lawful by a concern that
this would be the only device whereby the court could avoid the
unattractive result that the borrower could, if the agreement were
held to be illegal, simply retain the monies advanced by the lender.
Certainly, a majority of the Court of Appeal appeared to be of the
view that if the contract were illegal, the lender would not be able
to recover any of the monies advanced by relying on Lodge's case.
Again, as was suggested above in the discussion of St. John Shipping,
one wonders whether the Court would so easily have concluded that
the agreement was legal if all or some portion of the defendant's
obligations remained executory. If the borrower sought to resile
from the transaction before receiving any benefit thereunder, one
suspects that the temptation to hold the contract unenforceable by
reason of the lack of registration might well have been irresistible.
If that is so, the preferable analysis on the facts of Sidmay itself is
arguably that the contract is unenforceable but the lender is entitled
to recover the monies advanced to the borrower in a restitutionary
claim.
In any event, the holding of the Court of Appeal that the
mortgage was enforceable was unanimous and carefully reasoned.
Both the majority opinion of Kelly J.A. and the concurring opinion
of Laskin J.A. went on to consider, however, the extent of the
moneylender's right to recapture the monies advanced where the
transaction itself is found to be unenforceable. For Kelly J.A. that
issue was to be resolved by a straightforward application of Lodge's
case. Kelly J.A. accepted that the rule in Lodge's case would be
available to protect the moneylender only if, as was held in Cohen
v. Lester, the contract was illegal rather than unenforceable. Here,
the moneylender had engaged in a prohibited act and had brought
itself within the former category.1 31 There was, however, an
131(1967), 61 D.L.R. (2d) 358 at 378-79, per Kelly J.A.
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apparently insurmountable problem confronting the moneylender.
It was Kelly J.A.'s view that the relief made available to the
moneylender in Lodge's case was contingent upon the borrower
being a member of the class protected by the statute in question.
That is to say, the borrower must come before the court as plaintiff
as a member of the class protected by the statute1 32  The
moneylender is then entitled to insist that a condition of the
plaintiff's relief is repayment of the monies advanced. The class
protected by the Loan and Trust Corporations Act comprises those
persons who have invested in such companies whether as depositors
or shareholders or in some other manner. The plaintiff borrower in
Sidmay was not a member of this class; accordingly, Lodge's case
could not in his view apply.
In summary, then, Kelly J.A. espoused the view that the
moneylender should be entitled to a return of the monies advanced
only if the following two conditions are met:
1. the plaintiff borrower must be within the class protected
by the statute in question, and
2. the moneylender must have committed an offence and
thus rendered the transaction "illegal" rather than merely
"unenforceable."
Although Kelly J.A. evinces little enthusiasm in his judgment for
Chapman v. Michaelson, it might be safe to assume that he would
agree that a third condition must be met:
3. the relief sought by the plaintiff borrower must be of a
kind exclusively available in Equity rather than Common
Law.
This is, of course, a perfectly defensible reading of the English case
law. It must be emphasized, however, that the resulting rule is a
most peculiar one. The unsatisfactory nature of requirements two
and three have already been noted above.133 Requirement two
132Ibid. at 382.
133 In the discussion of the English cases in the text at notes 103-24, supra.
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represents the precise opposite of common sense.13 4 Requirement
three introduces arcane and artificial distinctions. Item one adds
further perversity. Surely the fact that the plaintiff is a member of
the protected class should work in his favour and reduce the ability
of the moneylender to seek a return of the funds. If, on the other
hand, the borrower was not a member of a protected class, this
would make the moneylender's claim for reimbursement all the more
compelling in terms of the underlying policy considerations.
Laskin J.A. offered a different and somewhat idiosyncratic
analysis of the moneylender's position if the agreement is found to
be illegal. His opinion introduced a novel distinction between cases
in which the agreement is "void so far as both parties are
concerned" and cases in which "the statutory prohibition is not one
which touches the plaintiff borrower." The case had been argued,
in Laskin J.A.'s view, on the assumption that its facts brought it
within the former category. The preferable view, he suggested, is
that the case fits in the second category, as the statutory prohibition
was one which touched the mortgagee alone. The unlawfulness was
in the lending, not the borrowing. Parenthetically, it should be
noted that it is not abundantly clear what kind of dividing line is
drawn here, unless it be something akin to the distinction between
illegality affecting the formation of an agreement as opposed to
illegality affecting the performance of an otherwise lawful
agreement.1 35 Certainly, however, the distinction is not one that has
been drawn by the English courts in, for example, the Moneylenders
Act cases themselves. Laskin J.A. did, however, proceed to an
analysis of the restitutionary rights of the moneylender in each
category of case. If, as the parties allegedly assumed, Sidmay falls
within the first category, it was Laskin J.A.'s view that the
moneylender was not entitled to impose repayment of the monies
advanced as a condition of allowing the borrower relief. Laskin J.A.
was less welcoming of the English authorities than Kelly J.A., and in
134 A point made with rather more restraint by R.E. Megarry, supra, note 118 and by
Lord Radcliffe in Kasumu v. Baba-Egbe, supra, note 120. And see the discussion in the text
at notes 121-22, supra.
135A distinction discussed by Devlin J. in St. John Shipping Corp. v. Rank, [1956] 3 All
E.R. 683 (Q.B.) at 687. And see, generally Furmston, supra, note 78, at 337.
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general terms advanced the views of Lord Radcliffe in Kasumu,
briefly described above. It was Laskin J.A.'s opinion that Lodge's
case had been "completely discredited"136 by Kasumu and, although
Laskin J.A. did not plainly state that he would refuse to apply the
decision, his analysis rather clearly suggests that he would. It was
also his view that the Moneylenders Acts cases were not, in any
event, useful to the lender on the facts of Sidmay inasmuch as the
plaintiff borrower was not a member of the class protected by the
statute. He, like Kelly J.A., accepted that this was a pre-condition
to the applicability of the Moneylenders Act cases.
Turning then to the second category of cases identified by
Laskin J.A., situations in which the plaintiff was not touched by the
illegality, the position of the moneylenders and, indeed, of
defendants more generally was considerably strengthened in Laskin
J.A.'s view. In what appears to be a quite unorthodox, if rather
sensible analysis, Laskin J.A. suggested that in these cases, the party
untouched by the illegality, such as the borrower in Sidmay, should
be permitted to go forward to undo the transaction only if the
plaintiff restores to the defendant the value of benefits received.
Thus, the borrower plaintiff in Sidmay would, indeed, be required
to restore the monies advanced by the defendant as a condition of
being permitted to unwind the transaction. The plaintiff's position
in these cases, it appears, is in effect one of seeking rescission and
being required to make a restitutio in integrum as a condition of
obtaining that relief.
Although Laskin J.A. did suggest that the imposition of a
requirement to make restitution was all the more compelling where
the plaintiff is not a member of a class protected by the statute, he
appeared to assume that members of a protected class could indeed
be subject to a requirement of this kind. The very case cited by
him in support of this rule, Lumley v. Broadway Coffee Co. Ltd
137
is in fact a case in which the plaintiff purchaser of securities from
an unregistered securities dealer, was a member of the class
protected by the statutory scheme in question. The plaintiff was not
136(1967), 61 D.LR. (2d) 358 at 384.
137[1935] O.R. 104, aff'd, [1935] O.R. 278 (CA).
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allowed to resile from the transaction because of his inability to
make restitutio in integrum.
The opinion of Laskin J.A., though rather difficult to support
on the authorities, is in its own way a rather remarkable tour de
force. Although the opinion appears to heap scorn on the rule in
Lodge's case, it in fact imposes a very similar doctrine on a much
broader range of cases and, indeed, imposes the requirement of
restitution on the plaintiff in Sidmay itself. If the reasoning of the
Laskin opinion were to be applied to the facts of the old
Moneylenders Act cases, it would appear that similar obligations
could have been imposed in all of the earlier cases inasmuch as it
seems to be true that in each case the illegality in question did not
touch the plaintiff borrower.1 38 Though this, if true, may be thought
to reveal an internal inconsistency in the opinion, nonetheless it is
obviously the case that Laskin J.A. was, broadly speaking, supportive
of the notion that restitution ought to be available in the form of
passive protection to in pad delicto defendants in a substantial range
of cases.
Though some may believe that Laskin J.A.'s unusual minority
opinion is the more attractive position in policy terms, it is
nonetheless true that the position advanced by Kelly J.A., which
narrowly circumscribes the availability of restitutionary protection
available to the defendant in these cases, more accurately reflects
the prevailing view. In very different ways, however, both opinions
offer abundant evidence of the remarkably unsatisfactory state of
current English and Canadian doctrine on these questions.
3. The modem cases - including the rise and fall of subrogation
In recent years there have been two assaults mounted on the
application of the ex turpi causa rule to moneylenders - one direct
and the other indirect. The direct assault involved an attempt to
persuade a court to narrowly confine Kasumu139 to its particular
statutory context and to give the moneylender a direct right of
1 3 8 To be sure, cases dealing with "unenforceability" rather than "illegality" may not fit as
neatly within Laskin J.A.'s category two.
139 [1956] A.C. 539 (P.C.).
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recovery for monies advanced. The second line of attack utilized
subrogation doctrine and would have enabled the moneylender to
recover any portion of the monies advanced used to discharge the
security interests of third parties. Neither of these approaches
enjoyed success. A brief account of these developments offers
further evidence of the dogged refusal of the English courts to
develop a general theory of relief available to moneylenders under
these statutes.
In Barclay v. Prospect Mortgages Ltd,140 moneylending
transactions were rendered unenforceable under section 6(1) of the
1927 Act by virtue of the parties' failure to record in their
documents the date on which the loan was made. The date was left
blank because the parties were uncertain when they signed the
memorandum of agreement that the transaction could be completed
on the same day.
The usual fact pattern in these cases was varied in Barclay
in one important respect. The security given to ensure repayment
of the loan was given, not by the borrower, but by a third party. It
was the third party who brought the present action for a declaration
that the arrangements concerning the security were unenforceable
and for delivery up of other relevant documents. For obvious
reasons, the moneylender could not argue that relief should be
conditional on repayment of the monies advanced; the third party
had not received any of these monies. The moneylender did argue,
however, that the relief requested ought to be denied in the
circumstances, thus setting the stage for a reconsideration of
Kasumu.
Two arguments were made on behalf of the moneylender
that are of interest in the present context. First, it was suggested
that the decision in Kasumu could be explained on the basis of
differences between the English and Nigerian legislation. Whereas
the 1927 Act provides that the contract and security are
"unenforceable," the Nigerian Ordinance stipulated that the
moneylender would not be entitled to enforce "any claim in respect
of any transaction." Moreover, the Nigerian Ordinance made the
failure to keep proper records an offence. Goulding . rejected this
14011974] 3 All E.R. 672 (Ch. D.).
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argument on the basis that the Judicial Committee did not seem to
have attached any significance to these differences in the statutory
context. We may note that another conclusion on this point might
have been possible. Lord Radcliffe had, after all, stressed that the
language of the Ordinance on this point was "very widely drawn,"
and he made a point of noting that the protection requested by the
moneylender amounted to "a claim" for the purposes of the
Ordinance 41 Nonetheless, Goulding J. is probably correct to
assume that Lord Radcliffe would have preferred the view that there
was no material distinction in the English context, even though he
did refrain from saying in Kasumu that Lodge's case ought not to be
followed in the future.
Secondly, it was argued on the moneylender's behalf that the
court should seek guidance from the manner in which analogous
problems involving agreements unenforceable for want of formality
are treated under such legislation as the Statute of Frauds, 167742
and various other more recent enactments derived from it.
Although the agreements themselves are unenforceable under these
statutes, they still have effect for many legal purposes and should be
given the effect here of immunizing the moneylender from this
action. (It was not emphasized, apparently, though it might well
have been, that restitutionary claims for the value of benefits
conferred are normally allowed in these other contexts). The
decision in Kasumu, it was argued, is inconsistent with these
decisions and ought not be followed. Goulding J. also found this
argument unattractive. In his view, the language, purpose, and
character of the Moneylenders Acts distinguished them from these
other statutory schemes. Whereas the moneylenders legislation was
expressly designed to ensure the protection of one class of persons,
borrowers, against another, lenders, the formality requirements of
the Statute of Frauds operate indifferently between parties, affording
protection to whichever of the parties was the potential defendant.
The word "enforceable" in the moneylenders legislation ought to be
read against the background of this statutory purpose, said Goulding
141[1956] AC. 539 at 546 and 551.
142(U..), 29 Car. II c. 3.
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J., and given the broad sweep attributed to the "any claim" language
of the Nigerian Ordinance by Lord Radcliffe.1 43 Again, though a
different conclusion would also have been possible on this point,
Goulding J.'s arguments are not without force and, moreover, they
come as close as one comes in this series of cases to an attempt to
articulate the policy objectives of the statute and relate them to the
remedial issue at hand. We shall return, at a later point in this
article, to a consideration of this proposed clear distinction between
cases of informality under the Statute of Frauds and illegality under
the moneylenders legislation. 144 In Barclay, then, the attempt made
on behalf of the moneylender to persuade the court to confine or
ignore Kasumu failed utterly.
For a brief period of time, a more fruitful device for
affording some relief to moneylenders was fashioned by the Court
of Appeal through extended application of one of the doctrines of
the law of subrogation. It is perhaps not as well understood as it
should be that two different patterns of subrogation are revealed in
the subrogation case law. We may refer to them as Type (A) and
Type (B).145
Type (A) subrogation arises in situations where a payer is
entitled to assert rights held by the payee against a third party in an
attempt to recoup the value of the payment made to the payee.
The most familiar application of this type is found in the context of
liability insurance. The insurer, who has indemnified the insured, is
entitled to assert all of the remedies of the insured, (typically in the
law of tort), against the individual who has caused the insured's
loss.146 As figure 1 below indicates, however, there are a number
143 [1974] 3 All E.R. 672 at 681-82.
144See the discussion in the text at notes 173-75, infra.
145See, generally, Lord Goff and G. Jones, The Law of Restitution, 3d ed. (London:
Sweet & Maxwell, 1986), c. 27. For Canadian references, see G.H.L. Fridman and J.G.
McLeod, Restitution, (Toronto: Carswell, 1982), c. 14; G. Klippert, Unjust Enrichment,
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1983), at 205-14.
146Although the insurer's right to subrogate may now be conferred by agreement or by
statute, it was initially recognized by the courts as arising not from the agreement itself, but
from elementary considerations of fairness and the nature of indemnity agreements. See, for
example, Bumard v. Rodocanachi (1882), 7 App. Cas. 333; Castellain v. Preston (1883), 11
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of other cases fitting this pattern. Some of these well established
instances include the right of a surety, once it has paid off the
principal debtor's obligation to the creditor, to enforce the creditor's
remedies against the principal debtor and have the benefit of any
securities deposited by the principal debtor with the creditor in
order to secure the debt 47  Similarly, creditors who have assisted
a trustee or personal representative of an estate in carrying on the
business of the trust or estate are entitled to be subrogated to the
right of indemnity or lien enjoyed by the trustee or representative
against the assets of the trust or estate.1 48 One could cite other
illustrations. It is more important to note simply that the category
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Q.B.D. 380; Rankin v. Potter (1873), L.R. 6 H.L. 83.
14 7See, for example, Parsons and Cole v. Briddock (1708), 2 Vern. 608, Et p. Crisp
(1744), 1 Atk. 133; MacDonald v. Hirsch, [1932] 4 D.L.R. 121 (N.S.C.A.); Traders Finance
Corp. v. Ross, [1942] O.R. 618.
14 8See, for example, Re Johnson (1880), 15 Ch. D. 548; Dowse v. Gorton and Others,
[1891] A.c 190.
1 4 9 See, for example, Orakpo v. Manson Investments Ltd, [1978] A.C. 95 at 112per Lord
Edmund-Davies.
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Type (B) subrogation involves the subrogation of the payer
to the rights of the third party in order to assert that party's rights
against the payee. It will be obvious that the payer must suffer an
inability, for some reason, to bring an action directly against the
payee. The typical examples involve the lending of money to
individuals who have no capacity to borrow. The lender may then
be able to subrogate to the position of a third party against the
borrower. As figure 2 indicates, typical examples include the case
of a lender who advances monies to a minor or mental incompetent
where these monies are in turn spent on the purchase of
necessaries.
TYPE 8
- ial payment oreonferral of vah e
..... - subrogj~ted claim
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That lender has the right to be subrogated to the position of the
supplier of those necessaries.150 Similar rights were conferred on
lenders who advanced money to married women in order to facilitate
the purchase of necessaries. Such lenders were entitled to assert
the rights of the suppliers of the necessaries against the husband.151
As well, it is well established that ultra vires borrowings are
recoverable to the extent that the monies advanced have been spent
by the ultra vires borrower on the discharge of intra vires debts.
15 2
The lender cannot enforce the lending agreements which the
borrower had no capacity to enter, but is entitled to be subrogated
to the rights of the intra vires creditors whose debts have been
discharged by means of the borrowed money.
Before turning to the cases dealing with illegal loans, a
preliminary point should be noted. It is well established in the case
law that the right of subrogation, whether it be Type (A) or Type
(B), does not arise from the parties' intentions. Although rights of
subrogation may be the subject of agreement, as they typically are
in the context of liability insurance, the right to subrogation arises
notwithstanding the absence of such agreements in order to prevent,
as we might now say, the unjust enrichment of the defendant by the
plaintiff53 Indeed, in the Type (B) cases, the notion of subrogation
is quite fanciful. The plaintiff is being subrogated to the rights of
persons whose debts have been discharged and thus now have no
rights at all. The plaintiff is allowed to bring a claim against the
payee on the pretext that its rights are being subrogated to the third
1 5 0See, for example, Marlow v. Pitfield (1719), 1 P. Vms. 558; Lewis v. Alleyne (1888),
4 T.L.R. 560; Re Beavan, [1912] 1 Ch. 196; Bank of Nova Scotia v. Kelly (1973), 41 D.L.R.
(3d) 273.
151See, for example, Harris v. Lee (1718), 1 P. Wins 482; Jenner v. Morris (1861), 3 DeG.
F. & J 45. This doctrine was rendered irrelevant, of course, by the recognition of the
contractual capacity of married women.
1528ee Re Cork and Youghal Riy (1869), L.R. 4 Ch. App. 748; Blackburn Benefit Building
Society v. Cunliffe Brooks & Co. (1822), 22 Ch. D. 61. A similar rule applies to unauthorised
borrowings by agents utilized to discharge legitimate debts of the principal. See, for example,
Bannayne v. D & C Maclver, [1906] 1 KB. 103.
153 The "unjust enrichment" rationale of subrogation was expressly articulated by Coyne
J.A. in Morison et al. v. Canadian Surety Co. et al., [1954] 4 D.L.R. 736 at 757 (Man. C.A.).
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party's rights, because it is determined that it is, for public policy
reasons, appropriate to allow the plaintiff some measure of relief
against the defendant. The remedies are made available
notwithstanding the absence of any intention either on the part of
the payee or of the third party to confer such a right. Indeed, in
many instances, it would be very unlikely that the parties would
address their minds to a question of such subtlety.
In Congresbury Motors Ltd v. Anglo-Belge Finance Co. Ltd,-5 4
the English Court of Appeal extended the availability of Type (B)
subrogation to the context of lending transactions rendered
unenforceable by the Moneylenders Acts. In that case, once again,
a commercial moneylending transaction was rendered unenforceable
due to the failure of the parties to insert the actual date of the loan
in the relevant documents. The money was lent to the plaintiff
corporation in order to enable it to purchase a filling station and
garage. Pursuant to their arrangement, the monies were advanced
by the lender directly to the vendor in return for the execution of
a deed of transfer to the plaintiff of the premises. This deed then
became subject to a mortgage in favour of the defendant. The
plaintiff sought a declaration that the transaction was unenforceable
and an order for the cancellation and delivery up of the mortgage
and other documents. The Court of Appeal noted that the
plaintiff's position was completely "devoid of ethical merit. ' 5 5 The
date had not been filled in at the time the mortgage was signed
because the date for completion had not yet been set. Later
insertion of the date did not meet the statutory requirements1 5 6
Understandably, the plaintiff relied on Kasumu and argued its right
to relief without having to repay the monies advanced.
The Court of Appeal held, however, that the moneylender
was entitled to the benefit of the vendor's lien and accordingly,
could recover the purchase price of the property from the plaintiff.
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied heavily on the analogy
15411970] 3 All E.R. 385 (CA.).
1 5 5 Ibid. at 387.
156 [1969] 3 All E.R. 545 at 552 per Plowman .
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of Thurstan's case,157 an earlier decision of the Court of Appeal,
which concerned a moneylender who had entered into a lending
agreement with an infant. The moneylender was allowed a similar
right of subrogation into a vendor's lien once the infant had, as she
was entitled to do, ratified the transaction and taken title to the
property. Russell L.J., for the Court, could see no relevant
distinction between Thurstan's case and the facts in Congresbury.
In Thurstan's case, the Court felt that the policy rendering infants'
moneylending contracts unenforceable was not violated by the
granting of the right of subrogation. So too, it was suggested, the
granting of subrogation in Congresbury would not conflict with the
underlying policy of the Moneylenders Acts.
Before considering the ultimate fate of Congresbury, it is
important to note the vulnerability of Russell L.J.'s position on this
point. In each of the Type (B) situations adverted to in figure 2
above, it is possible to identify a clear basis for the conclusion that
there is no material conflict between the policy underlying the rule
rendering the transaction unenforceable and the granting of the
subrogation right. In each case the general rule rendering
transactions of the kind in question unenforceable is not offended
by the granting of the particular form of relief. In the case of
infants' contracts for example, although there are obvious policy
reasons for rendering transactions with minors in general, and
moneylending transactions in particular, unenforceable, it is also true
that there is a strong policy justification for allowing suppliers of
necessaries to recover their value. The same policy justification can
be extended to moneylenders who facilitate the acquisition of
necessaries upon credit, thus providing a sound basis for an
exception to the general rule of unenforceability that is palatable in
policy terms. Similarly, the spending of ultra vires borrowings on
intra vires debts merely has the effect of changing the identity of
creditors and does not, in effect, increase the ultra vires debt load of
the borrower. Again, a policy justification for an exception to the
general rule is made out. As well, in Thurstan's case, contract law
ultimately permits minors to ratify and render binding agreements of
15 7Thurstan v. Nottingham Pennanent Benefit Building Society, [1902] 1 Ch. 1. An appeal
taken on a different point was unsuccessful; see [1903] A-C. 6.
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the kind at issue as an exception to the general rule of
unenforceability. An exception for money lent to facilitate such
transactions is therefore similarly defensible. No similar justification
can be developed, however, for the availability of subrogation in the
Congresbury context. It is irrelevant to the policy objectives of the
Moneylenders Acts that the money borrowed happens to be spent
by the borrower on the acquisition of an interest in realty. The
defective lending transaction is not rendered any less offensive to
the legislation by reason of the use made of the borrowed money.
Thus, if it is correct that the lender has no direct claim in money
had and received for the monies advanced, there appears to be no
policy justification for reaching a different conclusion with respect
to the subrogation claim. Curiously, however, this point of difficulty
with the holding in Congresbury was not considered when the issue
later came before the House of Lords.
In Orakpo v. Manson Investments Ltd,158 an opportunity was
afforded the House of Lords to review the Congresbury line of
authority.159 The familiar fact pattern was present. Substantial sums
of money had been advanced by a moneylender under a series of
seven transactions, all of which were designed to enable the
borrower to acquire interests in realty which would be utilized, in
turn, to secure the loans. The borrower was sophisticated and fully
aware of the terms of the borrowings. The transactions were
evidently carefully planned and heavily documented, but none of
them fully complied with section 6 of the 1927 Act. Six failed to
record a particular term in the written document. The seventh
misstated the date on which the monies were advanced. The
borrower defaulted and resisted repayment on the ground of the
moneylender's failure to comply with section 6. Basing its arguments
on Congresbury, the moneylender claimed to be entitled to be
subrogated to the interests of the vendors and other lien holders
whose interests had been discharged with the borrowed money. In
reply, the borrower argued that Congresbury ought to be overruled
and that, in any event, any such claim was now caught by the
158 [1978] AC. 95 (H.L).
1 5 9 See also, Coptic v. Bailey, [1972] 1 All E.R. 1242; Burston Finance Ltd v. Speirway,
[1974] 3 All E.R. 735.
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limitations period set out in section 13 of the Act. The Court of
Appeal indicated that it felt bound by its own previous decision in
Congresburj 60 and held that the subrogation claims would have
succeeded had they not been rendered stale by section 13. On
further appeal, the House of Lords agreed that the claims could be
disposed of on the limitations point but went on to hold that
Congresbury should be overruled. The central basis of this holding
was that subrogation could be available in a case of this kind only
if the parties had explicitly agreed that the borrowed monies should
be used to discharge the interests in question. 161 Such an
agreement would, in turn, be covered by section 6, with the result
that it will have to be recorded in the written agreement and that,
even so, it will not give rise to enforceable rights of subrogation if
some other defect renders the transaction unenforceable under
section 6.162 Such defects were present both here and in
Congresbury.
Another view of this matter could, of course, have been
taken. Viscount Dilhorne, dissenting on this point, would have held
that subrogated rights, once validly created by the parties'
agreement, would not be cut down by section 6.163 More generally,
however, as their Lordships were well aware, subrogation has often
been made available in other contexts in the absence of a binding
agreement of this kind. There appears to be no technical reason,
therefore, why subrogation could not have been imposed here in
order to prevent the unjust enrichment of the borrower.
Accordingly, it is not surprising that the decision has attracted
criticism,164 no doubt for the reason that Congresbury afforded at
160[1977] 1 All E.R. 666 at 684 (CA).
161[1978] A.C. 95 at 104-05 per Lord Diplock.
1 62 That is to say, that the right of subrogation is a "security given by the borrower" for
the purposes of section 6 and therefore cannot be enforced if the requirements of that section
are, for any reason, unmet. See ibid. at 105 per Lord Diplock.
1 63 1bid. at 109.
1 64 See, for example, Goff and Jones, supra, note 145 at 49-51 and 528; J. Batson,
"Unjust Enrichment and the Moneylenders Act" (1978) 41 Mod. L. Rev. 330.
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least some measure of relief in obviously compelling circumstances
where none other is available. The least persuasive aspect of their
Lordships' reasoning distinguished Thurstan's'6s case on the basis
that the applicable legislation in that case, the Infants Relief Act
187466 rendered the initial agreement "void," whereas section 6 of
the Moneylenders Act, 1927 merely rendered the agreement in
question "unenforceable." Perversely, then, their Lordships appear
to have concluded that the more determined Parliament is to nullify
the agreement, the more likely it is that the plaintiff will be able to
recover the value of benefits conferred under the agreement 67 If
it is not obvious that a Canadian court should or would follow
Orakpo, then, it must still be acknowledged that this form of relief
for the moneylender is a very poor substitute for a direct claim in
money had and received for the monies advanced. There being no
reason for treating monies utilized for the acquisition of interests in
realty in a special manner, the relief afforded by this device is
random and incoherent in policy terms. The important point for
present purposes, however, is simply that in Orakpo, the House of
Lords appears to have blocked the only escape route available in
English law from the iniquitous consequences of the traditional
judicial treatment of Moneylenders Act cases.
In summary, then, we see in the Moneylenders Act cases, a
body of doctrine in a rather advanced state of deterioration and a
judiciary that is apparently unwilling to evolve that doctrine in more
fruitful directions. This is surely an embarrassing chapter of English
private law jurisprudence, and is one that ought not be emulated
elsewhere. Nonetheless, it is submitted that the problems present in
these cases are merely colourful illustrations of more systemic
problems in the illegality jurisprudence. They offer persuasive
evidence of the need for a shift in our general approach to issues of
this kind.
1 6 5 Supra, note 157.
166The Infants Relief Act 1874, (U.K.), 37 & 38 Vict. c. 62
1 67The decision is criticized on this basis by Goff and Jones, supra, note 145 at 49-51
and 528.
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F. Illegality in the Context of the General Problem of Contracts in
Conflict with Statutory Policy
The traditional case law on "illegality" is not the only body
of common law dealing with benefits conferred under contracts in
conflict with statutory schemes of one kind or another. Thus, the
case law concerning agreements which fail on grounds of
"informality" or because the agreement in question is ultra vires the
contractual capacity of one of the parties must similarly effect a
reconciliation between a statutory policy precluding enforcement of
the agreements in question and the common law's general policy of
permitting recovery of the value of benefits conferred under
ineffective transactions. It is useful to compare the illegality rules
with doctrine in these other areas for two reasons. First, in these
related areas the courts have developed quite different solutions to
what appear to be rather similar problems. Secondly, careful
scrutiny reveals that illegality, informality, and ultra vires are not the
watertight compartments they are assumed to be under current law.
This constitutes a further inadequacy in the traditional approach to
the analysis of contracts in conflict with statutory policy.
The Statute of Frauds, 1677168 and the various statutes
derived from it throughout the common law world stipulate that
contracts of certain kinds cannot be enforced unless they are
recorded in a written document signed by the party against whom
enforcement is sought. In sharp contrast to the illegality context,
however, it is well established that the value of benefits conferred
under such agreements can be recovered in a restitutionary claim.
169
Indeed, it was precisely such a claim that was allowed in the
important decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Deglman v.
Guaranty Trust,170 in which the Court stated that such claims are
based on the unjust enrichment principle rather than on a theory of
obligation resting on an implied promise by the defendant to pay
16829 Car. II, c. 3.
1 69See, generally, Goff and Jones, supra, note 145, c. 20.
170[1954] 3 D.L.R. 785 (S.C.C.). For a recent and similar development in Australia, see
Pavey & Matthews Py. Ltd v. Paul (1987), 69 A.LR. 577 (H. C. of A).
852 [VOi. 25 NO. 4
1987] Restitutionary Recovery - The New Golden Rule 853
for benefits received if the agreement should prove to be
unenforceable. Restitutionary relief is allowed, we may safely
assume, because the courts are of the view that the policy
underlying the Statute of Frauds does not require the
impoverishment of plaintiffs as a class and the random conferral of
windfall benefits on defendants.
It is of interest, of course, that the form of section 6 of the
Moneylenders Ac4 1927171 is very similar to these provisions and,
accordingly, it is not surprising that the plaintiff moneylender in
Barclay v. Prospect Mortgages'72 attempted to press the analogy of
the Statute of Frauds case law. As has been noted, the attempt to
do so failed, though it is not at all clear that it should have.
Goulding J. distinguished the informality cases on the ground that
the Statute of Frauds was indifferent between plaintiffs as a class
and defendants on policy grounds, whereas the Moneylenders Acts
were aimed at the protection of the class of defendant borrowers
from claims brought by plaintiff money-lenders. Attractive as this
reasoning may at first appear, however, no such neat division can be
erected between "illegality" on the one hand and "informality" on the
other. Goulding J.'s view of the policy neutrality of the Statute of
Frauds, vis-A-vis plaintiffs and defendants, has some historical basis
in the initial objectives and the surrounding circumstances of the
statute at the time of its enactment in the late seventeenth
century.1 73 However, it is no longer true (if, indeed, it ever was)
that the statute is devoid of class protection elements. Thus, law
reform bodies have defended retention of the writing requirement
for guarantees on the basis that it serves to protect inexperienced
parties.174 Other provisions of the statute would no doubt be
17117 & 18 Geo. 5, c. 21
172 [1974] 3 All E.R. 672 (Ch. D.).
1 73 See C.D. Hening, 'The Original Drafts of the Statute of Frauds (29 Car. II, c. 3) and
their Authors," (1913) 61 U. Pa. L. Rev. 283.
174Law Revision Committee, Sixth Interim Report (Statute of Frauds and the Doctrine of
Consideration, (England, Cmnd. 5449, 1937) at 33; Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report
on Amendment of the Law of Contract (1987) at 111.
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defended on similar grounds 75 Further, it is not, of course, the
case that "illegality" as such is confined to class-protecting statutes.
Many statutes that give rise to "illegality" analysis advance policy
objectives that, in the sense intended by Goulding J., are indifferent
as between plaintiffs and defendants. In short, the distinction
proposed by Goulding J. simply does not effectively distinguish cases
of true illegality from mere informality.
More importantly, however, the endless variety of existing
and future statutory contexts will doubtless frustrate any attempt to
draw a clear dividing line between illegality and mere informality.
The Ontario Consumer Protection Act' 76 offers a useful illustration.
That statute provides that agreements for the supply of goods and
services, including credit, to consumers must be recorded in writing
in a particular manner.1 77 Failure to do so results in "executory"
portions of the agreement in question being "not binding" on the
buyer.1 78 Further, the supplier who fails to comply is subject to
prosecution under the offence provisions of the Act 79 and is liable
to penalties including both fine and imprisonment. It is further
provided, however, that a defence to such a charge will be made out
"where the person against whom the contravention is alleged proves
that the error or omission is a bona fide accidental or clerical error
or omission or beyond his control."180 Under a scheme of this kind,
it is not obvious whether suppliers who have failed to comply with
the Act's writing requirements should be permitted to bring
1 75This is most obviously true of the provision relating to minors' contracts, but would
also be part of any modem defence relating to the provisions relating to promises concerning
the transfer of interests in land, promises to pay liquidated damages and, perhaps, agreements
not to be performed within a year.
1 76R.S.0. 1980, c. 87.
1 77kbid. ss 1(i), 18, 19 and 24.
1 7 81kid. s. 19(2).
1 7 9 1bid. s. 39.
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restitutionary claims for the value of benefits conferred 81 Though
the traditional analysis would suggest that the answer to this
question turns on whether the writing requirements raise issues of
illegality or informality, it is not apparent that they fall neatly into
either category. Under the golden rule approach, careful
consideration would be given to whether the additional civil sanction
of the unavailability of restitutionary relief should be added by the
courts to the sanctioning scheme set out in the Act. It would be
noted that the sanctions provided for in the Act are not
insubstantial, that the Act allows the supplier to retain payments
made under executed agreements, and that the Act attaches no
penal consequences to breaches that are in some sense accidental or
incorrect. Such considerations might be thought by many to lead to
the conclusion that the sanctions set out in the statute are sufficient
and that the further sanction of making restitutionary relief
unavailable would inappropriately penalize conduct that the Act
itself determines to be innocent. In addition, they would impose an
artificial distinction between situations in which the supplier has
been paid and where he has not. Other views are, of course,
possible. One might argue that, at least in the case where an
offence has been committed, it is desirable for the common law to
provide an additional disincentive to this form of wrongdoing. Such
a disincentive would discourage unscrupulous parties from risking the
quasi-criminal sanctions and attempting to run up their profits
through misleading conduct, secure in the knowledge that they
should, at the very least, be able to recover the value of benefits
conferred on others. Those who are attracted by this consideration
might wish to hold, however, that restitutionary relief should be
allowed where no offence has been committed. And so on. The
important point for present purposes is not that one is driven
inescapably to any particular conclusion with respect to this issue,
but rather that our understanding of the problem is enhanced by
this contextual approach and, by way of contrast, is not advanced
1 8 1 Interestingly, one Ontario court held the agreement in such a case binding on the
basis of a most dubious interpretation of the concept of "executory contract". See J Schofield
Manuel Ltd v. Rose (1975), 9 O.R. (2d) 404 (Co. Ct.). This appears to be a further
illustration of the phenomenon discussed in Part III of this article, of a court holding the
agreement enforceable on dubious grounds in order to prevent an unjust enrichment.
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one iota by focusing attention narrowly on the (perhaps
unanswerable) question of whether these particular statutory writing
requirements raise issues of illegality or informality.
Similar points can be made with respect to the common law's
treatment of ultra vires agreements. As in cases of informality, it is
well established that parties who have entered into agreements that
are ultra vires their contractual capacity can recover the value of
benefits conferred on the other partys2 It is not difficult to see
why this is and should be so. Any other outcome would be
inconsistent with the underlying policy of preserving the assets of
the ultra vires actor and attempting to ensure that its resources are
directed to its legitimate objectives. Thus, even though he or she
has failed to adhere to a governing regulatory scheme, the ultra vires
party can recover in a restitutionary claim. Holman v. Johnson is
not considered to be a relevant authority. Again, however, it is not
every case that can easily be classified as ultra vires rather than
illegal. For example, provincial legislation regulating the affairs of
credit unions typically provides that these unions can make loans
only to members of the credit union1 83 Thus, it might be said that
a loan to a non-member is ultra vires the credit union. In addition,
however, these statutes may also provide that the entering into of
transactions with a non-member constitutes an offence.184 Does this
not render the transaction illegal and subject to the rigours of
Holman v. Johnson? And yet, since such an outcome is so contrary
to the underlying statutory policy, it is tempting to classify the
problem as one of ultra vires and take the view that Holman v.
Johnson is irrelevant. Again, however, the relevant consideration is
18218Breckenridge Speedway v. R., [1970] S.C.R. 174. And see, Goff and Jones, supra, note
145, c. 22.
18 3See, for example, The Credit Unions and Caisses Populaires Act R.S.O. 1980, c. 102 s.
81.
18 4Prior to 1976, this was the case in Ontario, for example, where the making of an
unauthorized loan would have been captured by the legislation's general offence provision. See,
The Credit Unions Act R.S.O. 1960, c.79,ss 4, 23, 29, and 59. Reforms enacted in 1976,
however, replaced the general offence provision with a series of narrowly defined offence
provisions which would not render the making of an unauthorized loan, per se, an offence. See,
1976 S.O., c.76, ss 141-44, and, now, R.S.O., 1980 c.102,ss 141-44.
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obviously a matter of determining whether the granting of
restitutionary relief is consistent with the underlying regulatory
policy, rather than a matter of attempting to classify the case as
truly ultra vires rather than illegal. Fortunately, the Canadian court
that has considered this question simply ignored the potential
applicability of Holman v. Johnson and allowed relief in order to
prevent, as it was said, a borrower from being "unjustly enriched."185
It is evident, then, that there are no obvious and clear
dividing lines severing true "illegality" from these related phenomena.
Indeed, the traditional "illegality" cases are merely points on a
continuum of cases dealing with transactions in conflict with
statutory policy. As is recognized by the courts in cases of
informality and ultra vires, what is generally required in these cases
is an analysis of the underlying objectives of the statutory policy that
renders the transaction unenforceable, and an analysis of the
implications of those objectives for the parties' restitutionary
liabilities. To attempt to resolve these problems by labelling some
cases as "illegality" cases and others as something else simply
obscures the more general nature of this problem set and the need
for a contextual and policy-oriented analytical framework within
which to assess the validity of claims for restitutionary relief.
G. Doctrinal Support for the New Golden Rule
The preceding sections of this article have offered a series of
principled arguments in favour of a more explicit adoption of a
golden rule approach to the analysis of restitutionary claims for the
value of benefits conferred under agreements that are in conflict
with statutory policy. For some readers, however persuasive such
arguments might appear to be, a further question will be of interest.
To what extent can the golden rule approach be said to derive
support from the existing case law? To put the matter differently,
to what extent are judges who take the doctrine of stare decisis
seriously free to supplant the traditional reliance on Holman v.
1 8 5 Calednia Commercial Credit Union v. Haldimand Feed Mill Ltd (1974), 3 O.R (2d)
460 at 463, per Van Camp J., a case decided under the pre-1976 Ontario legislation, referred
to, supra, note 184. And see La Caisse Populaire Notre Dame Ltee v. Moyen (1967), 61 D.L.R.
(2d) 118 (Sask. Q.B.).
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Johnson with the adoption of the golden rule approach? There are
a number of points to be made in response.
First, the golden rule approach is manifest, though rarely
explicitly espoused, in the existing case law in a variety of ways.
Thus, the exceptions to Holman v. Johnson itself18 6 must rest
ultimately on an analysis that is consistent with the golden rule
approach. The application of the "not in pari delicto" exception in
Kiriri Cotton v. Dewani,18 7 for example, rests on a determination by
the court that the underlying policy objectives of the statute in
question would be hindered rather than furthered by a refusal to
allow restitutionary relief. In the same vein, though this may seem
less persuasive, judicial reliance on the golden rule approach is to
some extent evident in the difficult jurisprudence that has developed
at the borders of the traditional exceptions. As has been argued
above,188 judges who have concluded that considerations of public
policy favour the granting of restitutionary relief are inclined to
stretch the exceptions to accommodate that result. Further, as St.
John Shipping indicates, the golden rule approach has been explicitly
adopted in the analysis of the threshold question of enforceability.
18 9
One can argue that, a fortiori, it must be available to analyze the
second level question of the availability of restitutionary relief. If
one looks beyond the boundaries of traditional "illegality," it is
plainly the case that the golden rule approach is manifest in the
treatment of parallel questions in cases dealing with informal and
ultra vires agreements.1 90 The plaintiffs in these cases are, in some
sense, in pari delicto and, indeed in the ultra vires cases may have
committed an offence. Nonetheless, restitutionary relief is allowed
because it is felt that the granting of such relief is consistent with
the policy objectives of the statutory scheme in question. In these
186Briefly described in the text at notes 21-49, supra.
187Supra, note 25.
1 88See the discussion in the text at notes 65-76, supra.
1 89See the text at notes 50-58, supra.
190see the text at notes 168-85, supra.
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various ways, then, the existing case law may be said to offer
indirect support for the golden rule approach.
More than this, however, there exists within the traditional
illegality case law a strain of authority openly allowing restitutionary
relief in favour of plaintiffs who cannot bring themselves within one
of the traditional exceptions to the rule in Holman v. Johnson.
Typically, judgments in these cases simply do not refer to the
Holman v. Johnson problem. Occasionally, however, judges have
indicated that if forced to choose between doing justice and slavish
adherence to earlier precedents, they would choose the former
path.1 91 Three devices for protecting the restitutionary interests of
in pari delicto parties are to be found in the cases. First, there are
cases in which plaintiffs have been straightforwardly allowed to bring
claims for the value of benefits conferred on the other party. Thus,
for example, (and notwithstanding the existence of authority to the
contrary),192 plaintiffs have been permitted to recover benefits
conferred under agreements rendered invalid by Sunday observance
legislation! 93 Secondly, courts have occasionally allowed a not in
pari delicto party merely to rescind the agreement with the
consequence that a restitutio in integrum would have to be made to
the in pari delicto party. Thus, a purchaser of securities from an
unregistered trader has been allowed to rescind the purchase
agreement on the condition that the value of benefits received be
191 See, for example, Davidson & Co. Ltd v. McLeery (1969), 6 D.L.R. (3d) 331
(B.C.S.C.).
1 9 2 See, for example, In re Jorgensen, [1923] 2 W.W.R. 600 (Sask. K.B.); Superior Motors
v. Cade, [1930] 2 W.W.R. 448 (Sask. C.A.); Miller v. Stevens (1982), 56 N.S.R. (2d) 389 (Co.
Ct.).
193 See, for example, Bronfman v. Dutchzesan, [1919], 3 W.W.R. 565 (Sask. CA);
Schuman v. Drab (1919), 49 D.L.R. 57 (Sask. CA.); Ciz v.-Hauka (1953), 11 W.W.R (N.S.)
433 (Man. Q.B.); Worton v. Sauve (1977), 80 D.L.R. (3d) 382 (Alta. Dist. Ct.). And see, for
other methods of securing relief; Demchenko v. Fricke, [1926] 2 W.W.R. 221 (Sask. CA),
(implied agreement to compensate); Neider v. Carda of Peace River District (1972), 25 D.L.R.
(3d) 363 (S.C.C.), (proprietary relief); McDonald v. Fellows (1979), 105 D.L.R. (3d) 434 (Alta.
C.A.), (creative use of the locus poenitentiae exception). As well, of course, courts have been
astute to find grounds for holding that the statute does not apply and enforcing the
agreement, thus providing another illustration of the phenomenon outlined in Part III of this
article. See, for example, Bergen v. Billingham (1972), 28 D.L.R. (3d) 99 (Man. Q.B.); Holmes
v. Alerson, (1974), 54 D.L.R. (3d) 175 (Ont. H.C.), aff'd, (1976), 69 D.L.R. (3d) 223 (C.A.).
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restored to the seller.194 This view of the applicable law received
the support of Laskin J.A. in his concurring opinion in Sidmay v.
Wehttam Investments.195 It should not go unnoticed, of course, that
this is a view which is quite inconsistent, at the level of general
principle, with the approach taken in the English Moneylenders Act
cases.1 96 Thirdly, there are cases in which courts have refused to
allow not in pai delicto parties to recover monies paid to the
defendant in return for services rendered under an illegal
agreement.197  Again, the consequence is to allow in pai delicto
parties a form of protection of their restitutionary interest.
In more recent years, Ontario trial judges have begun to
acknowledge explicitly the strength of the kinds of criticisms of
Holman v. Johnson that have been made here and have suggested
that the appropriate solution is to allow straightforward
restitutionary claims for the value of benefits conferred. In Beme
Developments Ltd v. Haviland,198 Saunders J. observed that "[iln
recent years, there has been a recognition of the desirability [of]
balancing the need to preserve public policy by not enforcing illegal
agreements and the need to avoid unjust enrichment." He went on
to observe that "[t]he striking of the balance may depend in each
case on the extent of the illegality and the unjust enrichment." On
the facts of that case, the parties to an agreement for the purchase
and sale of land had deceived the first mortgagee by not disclosing
the existence of a second mortgage taken back, in effect, by the
vendor. Although it was Saunders J.'s view that this conduct
rendered the transaction unenforceable and that the plaintiff second
194Lumley v. Broadway Coffee Co. Ltd, [1935] O.R. 104, (affd), [1935] O.R. 278. See
also, Re Ontario Securities Commission and British Canadian Commodiy Options Ltd, (1979),
93 D.L.R. (3d) 208 (Ont. H.C.).
195(1967), 61 D.L.R. (2d) 358 at 388.
196For discussion of which see the text at notes 100-67, supra.
19 7See, for example, Hasiuk v. Oshanek, [1936] 1 D.L.R. 232 (Man. C.A.).
198(1983), 40 O.R. (2d) 238 at 250, drawing support, inter alia from the statement of
Masten J.A. in Steinberg v. Cohen quoted above in note 99, supra. See further, the discussion
in note 212, infra.
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mortgagee, therefore, ought to be unable to enforce the mortgage
and recover interest owing, it was nonetheless appropriate in his
view that the purchaser be required to complete repayment of the
value received by restoring the principal amount of the mortgage to
the plaintiff. The conduct of the parties, though reprehensible, was
not such as to justify the defendant's enrichment at the plaintiff's
expense. Similarly, another Ontario trial judge1 99 has suggested that
claims in quantum meruit might be allowed to unlicensed tradesmen
whose contracts of employment, as a result of the decision to this
effect of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Kocotis v. DAngelo,200 are
normally held to be unenforceable. Again, the apparent assumption
is that although the plaintiff is indeed in pari delicto, the nature of
the offence is not such that the additional civil sanction of denying
restitutionary relief is appropriate.
Further, in an important Australian decision, the High Court
has adopted a golden rule approach to the analysis of a claim
brought by a builder to recover the value of work performed under
an oral building contract rendered "unenforceable" by section 45 of
the New South Wales Builders Licensing Act. In Pavey & Matthews
Pty. Ltd v. Paul,20 1 the builder was allowed to recover in quantum
meruit as the court was of the view that granting such relief would
not, in the circumstances of the case, undermine the objectives of
the statute. Wisely, the Court refrained from expressly classifying
the problem as one of "illegality" or "informality." Though the
Court appeared to be impressed by the analogical force of the
Statute of Frauds cases, it did not plainly so state. On the other
hand, no reference was made to Holman v. Johnson and no
199Monticchio v. Torcema Construction Ltd et al. (1979), 102 D.L.R. (3d) 462 per R.E.
Holland J., (Ont. H.C.).
20011958] O.R. 104. And see Calax Construction Inc. v. Lepofsky (1974), 5 O.R. (2d) 259
(H.C.) but cf. Day & Night Heating Ltd v. Brevick (1962), 35 D.L.R. (2d) 436 (B.C. Co. Ct.),
(unlicensed contractor - agreement enforceable); C Battison & Sons Inc. v. Mauti et aL (1986),
34 D.L.R. (4th) 700 (Ont. Div. Ct.), (licensed contractor - oral agreement held enforceable).
The latter two cases are, arguably, further illustration of the phenomenon described in Part
III of this article.
201(1987), 69 A.L.R. 577, noted by J. Beatson in (1988), 104 L.Q.R. 13.
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suggestion was made that the agreement was "illegal" though
obviously such a holding would have been possible.
In short, then, there are a number of features of existing
doctrine in this area that are consistent with the golden rule
approach. As well, there are recent developments offering more
direct support for it. The analysis offered in this article can be
defended in part, then, on the basis that it merely renders explicit
the underlying structure of some features of current law and
provides an analytical basis for initiatives already being undertaken
in the reported cases. To be sure, however, more open
acknowledgment of the availability of restitutionary relief to in padi
delicto plaintiffs and a more explicit adoption of the golden rule
analysis in the restitutionary context would represent a shift in
judicial thinking. Indeed, there would be little point in writing at
such length on this subject, were this not the case. Doctrinal
support for such a development can be drawn, however, from the
adoption by the Supreme Court of Canada of the American unjust
enrichment analysis of restitutionary claims. This development has
been described many times elsewhere,2 02 and it is sufficient for
present purposes simply to note that in a series of decisions over
the past thirty years or so,203 the Supreme Court has moved away
from the traditional English view of quasi-contract and constructive
trust and has adopted the American view that these two bodies of
law are better understood and analyzed if they are brought together
to form a modem law of restitution having as its central organizing
principle the proposition that "a person who has been unjustly
enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution
to the other."204 Although recognition of the utility of the unjust
enrichment analysis is, in the main, a matter of reorganizing and
2 02See, for example, G. Klippert, Unjust Enrichment (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983) c. 2.
203The important cases are, Degiman v. Guaranty Trust et al. [1954] 3 D.L.R. 785
(S.C.C.); County of Carleton v. City of Ottawa (1965), 52 D.L.R. (2d) 220 (S.C.C.); Rural
Municipality of Storthoaks v. Mobil Oil Canada Ltd (1975), 55 D.L.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.); Pettlkus
v. Becker (1980), 117 D.L.R. (3d) 257 (S.C.C.). A similar development has now occurred in
Australia. See Pavey & Matthews Ply. Ltd v. Paul, supra, note 201.
204American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Restitution (1937) s. 1. See,
generally, Goff and Jones, supra, note 145, c. 1.
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rendering more accessible and more coherent the existing rules of
quasi-contract and constructive trust, it is also the case that this
development has carried with it an increasing recognition of the
appropriateness of allowing claims of this kind. Thus, in Pettkus v.
Becker,205 the Supreme Court of Canada, relying heavily on the
unjust enrichment analysis, gave recognition to what is, in effect, a
new cause of action relating to the division of matrimonial or quasi-
matrimonial property upon dissolution of the parties' relationship.
It is not argued here that a similarly dramatic break with the past is
required in the illegality context. On the contrary, it has been
argued that what is required is an explicit recognition of the
underlying structure of much of our existing law and further
development of initiatives already under way. Nonetheless, to the
extent that adoption of the analysis offered here requires the courts
to place greater emphasis on the availability of restitutionary claims
in this context, this would be a development that is very much
consistent with the modem treatment of restitutionary claims in
Canadian restitutionary law.
The unjust enrichment analysis has not, however, been as
enthusiastically embraced in England.20 6 Accordingly, it may be that
in the English context, the most attractive device for weaving a
development of this kind into the fabric of existing law would be a
revitalization and expansion of the equitable exception to Holman
v. Johnson briefly referred to above.207  Although this device has
lain dormant for several decades, it has the attraction of being an
open-ended category of cases in which relief is made available simply
because it is warranted on public policy grounds. It thus appears
205(1980), 117 D.LR. (3d) 257 (S.C.C.). For discussion of the possible implications of
this decision for the general law of restitution, see J.D. McCamus, "The Restitutionary
Remedy of Constructive Trust" in Special Lectures of the Law Society of Upper Canada; 1981
(Toronto, L.S.U.C.) at 85-123; J.D. McCamus, "The Role of Proprietary Relief in the Modem
Law of Restitution" in F. McArdle (ed.), The Cambridge Lectures, 1987 (forthcoming).
206See, generally, Goff and Jones, supra, note 204. Thus, for example, it may well be
that Lord Diplock's apparent lack of enthusiasm for the "unjust enrichment principle"
contributed to the decision to overrule the Congresbury line of authority in Orakpo v. Manson
Investments. See, [1978] A.C. 95 at 104. And see further, the discussion in the text at notes
145-67, supra.
207In the text at notes 37-45, supra.
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well suited to further development and it would not, of course, be
the first such equitable doctrine to enjoy renewed vigour in the
present century.
Finally, it may be observed that even in the absence of a
development of this kind, however desirable it may be, considerable
progress can be achieved through the deployment of the traditional
techniques of confining the reach of unattractive earlier authority.
It has been argued above that this field suffers from an excess of
generalization and, indeed, the main thrust of the golden rule
approach is one of focusing attention on the specific statutory
context at issue and assessing the private law implications of its
structure and underlying objectives. The effect of doing so, of
course, is to limit the influence by analogy of past error. Thus, to
choose but one example, if it is indeed the case that the English
courts have painted themselves into a corner from which they will
not emerge in the Moneylenders Act cases,208 there is no compelling
reason or need to repeat this experience in other statutory contexts
and, indeed, in other jurisdictions in which English authority is not
binding. Perhaps a concern of this kind with our tendency to over-
generalize in this area underlies Laskin J.A.'s observation in Sidmay
v. Wettham Investments that "I doubt whether a single rationalizing
principle can be applied to the English money-lender cases or,
indeed, to cases on illegality in general".2' 9 A similarly cautious
approach to past authority more generally would no doubt be a
constructive development. It must be added, however, that
incremental adjustment of this kind will not meet the need for a
more basic and pervasive change in the analytical framework within
which these problems are addressed.
In summary, then, there is considerably more support for the
golden rule approach in the existing doctrine than might at first be
appreciated. To the extent that some evolution and adjustment of
doctrine in this area is needed, however, the necessary doctrinal
tools for accomplishing such change are readily available.
2"Discussed in the text at notes 100-07, supra.
209(1967), 61 D.L.R. (2d) 358 at 384.
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V. CONCLUSION
In St. John Shipping v. Rank,210 Devlin J. offered an analysis
of the question of whether a particular agreement is unenforceable
on grounds of statutory illegality. This analysis placed the issue in
the context of the objectives and structure of the statutory scheme
in question and in the context of the general policy of the common
law favouring the enforceability of agreements. The question may
to some extent be one of attempting to divine legislative intent.
But here, as in many other contexts, the legislators often appear to
have assumed a reasonable division of labour between the legislature
and the courts and have simply left the issue at large. The attempt
in these circumstances, then, must be to articulate a rule of common
law that is complementary to anod consistent with the statutory
scheme, and that is as consistent as possible with general common
law principles.
What has been suggested here is the adoption of a similar
analysis for the secondary question of restitutionary liability that
arises once it has been determined that the contract is
unenforceable. Too often in the past it has been simply assumed
that the contractual and restitutionary issues can be collapsed and
that if there is a policy basis for refusing to enforce the agreement,
so, too, is there a policy justification for refusing restitutionary relief.
That this is plainly not so becomes evident when one considers the
questions of enforceability and restitutionary relief for what they are
- as determinations by the judiciary to impose or withhold additional
civil sanctions beyond those sanctions, if any, that have been
imposed by the statutory scheme itself. As has been argued, the
sanction of unenforceability of the contract is different in important
ways from the sanction of not allowing relief in restitution.211 The
policy analysis that would support the imposition of the former
would not necessarily support the latter. Indeed, it has been argued
that there will be many circumstances, in addition to these now
210[1967] 3 All E.R. 683 (Q.B.), for discussion of which see Part III of this article.
2 1 1 See the text at notes 15-17, supra.
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clearly recognized in our law,212 in which it will be appropriate to
'hold the agreement unenforceable but still allow a restitutionary
claim. The enquiry in each case, then, must be one of determining
whether the policies underlying the statutory scheme 213 that renders
the agreement unenforceable would also be well-served by the denial
of restitutionary relief and then of assessing the desirability of doing
so in the light of the general policy of the common law to allow
restitutionary recovery of benefits conferred under ineffective
transactions.214 This approach to the analysis of restitutionary claims
- here referred to as the new golden rule - has been argued to be
manifest in a number of features of our current law on the
consequences of illegality and in recent developments in this area.
It becomes all the more apparent that this approach is in fact
utilized by the judiciary and that, indeed, its use is indispensable if
attention is drawn beyond the boundaries of traditional "illegality" to
the more general problem of agreements in conflict with statutory
authority, of which illegality forms only a part. As has been seen,
215
the case law on ultra vires and "informality" reaches different
conclusions than the illegality cases, no doubt because a contextual
analysis of the golden rule variety suggests that these kinds of
statutory schemes, which, at their margins cannot be clearly
distinguished from "illegality," do not, as a matter of policy, require
the withholding of restitutionary relief.
More explicit recognition of the value of the golden rule
approach in the context of the traditional "illegality" cases would,
however, facilitate more thoughtful analysis of these issues and a
reconsideration of the value of earlier authority. Moreover, explicit
2 1 2 That is, the recognized exceptions to the rule in Holman v. Johnson, briefly described
in the text at notes 21-49, supra.
213Although the focus of discussion here has been statutory illegality, the golden rule
approach applies equally well to cases of common law illegality. One must simply ask whether
the policies underlying the rule of common law that renders the agreement unenforceable also
require rejection of restitutionary relief. Indeed, Berne Developments Ltd v. Haviland,
discussed supra, note 198, was a case of common law illegality.
214See the discussion in note 16, supra.
215See the text at notes 168-85, supra.
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adoption of this approach would, it has been argued, relieve the
pressure otherwise bearing on the enforceability concept to render
agreements enforceable in order to accommodate what are in effect
restitutionary objectives.21 6 Such a development would also relieve
the pressure on the established exceptions to the Holman v. Johnson
principle to expand in order to accommodate what are, in reality,
meritorious restitutionary claims of in pari delicto parties. As well,
it has been argued (albeit somewhat more tentatively) that a similar
treatment of proprietary questions arising in this context would
similarly be fruitful.
217
The main elements of the golden rule approach have been
set forth in some detail in earlier sections of this paper.2 18  It has
been argued that a more open use of this type of analysis would
lead to a greater recognition of the availability of restitutionary relief
to parties who are, in the traditional sense, in pari delicto.
Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that it is not part of the thesis
here advanced that such relief should invariably, or perhaps even
normally, be available to such parties. The appropriateness of
granting such relief is a matter to be determined on a case by case
basis. What is being suggested is that the golden rule approach will
generate consideration of the factors that are material to the
determination of whether such a claim should lie. To the extent
that this approach is likely to lead, however, to a greater availability
of restitutionary claims in this context, this development should be
seen as consistent with more general developments occurring in
Canadian restitutionary law.
219
2 1 6 This phenomenon has been described and criticized in Part III of this article. Further
illustrations may be found in the text at note 130, supra and in notes 181, 193, and 200, supra.
2 1 7 See text at notes 77-89, supra.
2 1 8 See the text at notes 62-64 supra, and for a brief illustration of its application, the
discussion of the Ontario Consumer Protection Act at notes 176-82, supra.
219See the text at notes 202-06, supra.

